From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B681C44515 for ; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:27:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wlqq0-0003t1-KU; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:27:28 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wlqpo-0003pS-J3 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:27:21 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wlqpm-0001l9-HZ for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:27:16 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1784564833; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=a4pkRGLKbGCXxh8CZiqu6e8rmpeumcxI0+YF79N4T60=; b=HCWnxhecOxR3aCxPhGjG+Mq3NDZFBcfbvJDVW/VlybloTEsADbJwx9+7Xt3bIiG5TLq0fe YYUc8BsQRs+P9ErJz/NvHRlHRCvjwsYMTYLRDoyDj7df10aXtnXIUgMZrB+FQndnfec080 wZrGuH+cdUDwpcNaILHN4j+nMj3hlZk= Received: from mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-691-1w_u3WFpOx65hUdQMBqpAQ-1; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 12:27:10 -0400 X-MC-Unique: 1w_u3WFpOx65hUdQMBqpAQ-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: 1w_u3WFpOx65hUdQMBqpAQ_1784564829 Received: from mx-prod-int-10.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-10.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.95]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E56C11944B21; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:27:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (unknown [10.44.50.22]) by mx-prod-int-10.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 35E7B158E; Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 17:27:00 +0100 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: Fabiano Rosas Cc: =?utf-8?Q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9?= Lureau , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth , Alex =?utf-8?Q?Benn=C3=A9e?= , =?utf-8?Q?C=C3=A9dric?= Le Goater , Peter Maydell , Mauro Matteo Cascella , "Michael S. Tsirkin" , Philippe =?utf-8?Q?Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= , Pierrick Bouvier , Peter Xu Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: outline some guidelines for security classification Message-ID: References: <20260707105927.2776822-1-berrange@redhat.com> <87jyqv3u32.fsf@suse.de> <87zezl3ag5.fsf@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <87zezl3ag5.fsf@suse.de> User-Agent: Mutt/2.4.0 (2026-06-19) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.6 on 10.30.177.95 Received-SPF: permerror client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: 12 X-Spam_score: 1.2 X-Spam_bar: + X-Spam_report: (1.2 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.01, RCVD_IN_SBL_CSS=3.335, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 01:14:18PM -0300, Fabiano Rosas wrote: > Daniel P. Berrangé writes: > > > On Thu, Jul 16, 2026 at 11:08:49AM -0300, Fabiano Rosas wrote: > >> Assumptions: > >> > >> A) The migration stream is assumed to be secured by TLS on a per-host > >> basis. > >> > >> B) For migration streams stored to file, including snapshots, it is > >> assumed that the storage file is authentic, i.e. the files are owned by > >> the party performing the live migration and have not been tampered with. > >> > >> C) The network ports used for migration are expected to be available > >> only during migration. No long-standing listening destination QEMU > >> process. > >> > >> D) The network used for migration is expected to be adequately isolated. > >> > >> E) The migration source QEMU process is assumed to be secure. Compromise > >> of the source QEMU process is nonetheless possible but exploiting the > >> migration process is expected to grant no further privileges. > > > > > > In the security.rst doc, we have an "Architecture" heading where > > we outline design principals for security. The "Assumptions" feels > > like it has overlap with that section. > > > > What if we tweak that section to be more broad? > > - Under "Guest Isolation": > > Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests... > > s/unless explicitly shared between/, users and processes unless explicitly shared with/ > > ... them by the user. > > - Under Isolation Mechanisms, we can add a bullet: > > - Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure > hypervisor authenticity and encryption of the live migration > connection. > > I can send a separate patch with this. > > >> For security consideration, the following are considered: > >> > >> OUT OF SCOPE: > >> > >> 1) Abort of destination QEMU process while migration is still in course. > >> Rationale: the source virtual machine is not affected. > >> > >> 2) Migration failure. > >> Rationale: eventual failed migrations are part of normal operation. > >> > >> 3) Memory over-allocation issues in the destination QEMU process. > >> Rationale: the destination host's operating system is expected to > >> constrain resource usage. Process termination due to OOM falls under > >> point 1 above. > > > > The "Security boundary scope" section has primarily been listing > > things that are definitely "out of scope". > > > > I think the only point not yet covered is the destination crash > situation, could we add this to your patch? FYI, my patch is already merged, so please just submit a followup patch to augment the info I added. > > * **migration and snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load > failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the source > virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still > functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot > destination is similarly not considered a security issue. We should likely distinguish live migration from snapshots a little. In live migration if loading aborts, we still have the source VM running fine. With snapshots if you launch a new QEMU and restore from snapshot there was no source VM that's relevant. With snapshots if you have a running QEMU and rollback to a snapshot (with loadvm), and QEMU crashes, you've lost your currently running QEMU. With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|