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From: Hao Zhang <hao_zhang_kdev@163.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Mark nested RSM-created VM-Enter as untrusted
Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 14:08:34 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <al8M4gCwsWXS_jMs@192.168.1.215> (raw)

From: Hao Zhang <zhanghao1@kylinos.cn>

RSM can restore state that indicates the vCPU was running L2 when SMI
arrived.  KVM then re-enters nested guest mode and marks nested_run_pending
so that the next KVM_RUN completes the pending nested transition.

Unlike a normal nested VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME, the state restored by RSM comes
from SMRAM.  Userspace can modify SMRAM before RSM.  The resulting L2 state
may require invalid-guest-state emulation.  If KVM trusts that pending run,
VMX can synthesize EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE before hardware VM-Entry
completes the pending run and trip the nested_run_pending invariant.

Do not treat an RSM-created pending nested run as KVM-trusted state.  Mark
the run as KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING_UNTRUSTED for both VMX and SVM, matching
the existing userspace-modified-state handling in kvm_x86_vcpu_pre_run().

Fixes: 2bb8cafea80b ("KVM: vVMX: signal failure for nested VMEntry if emulation_required")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao Zhang <zhanghao1@kylinos.cn>
---
Changes in v2:
- Mark nested state restored by RSM from SMRAM as KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING_UNTRUSTED.
- Keep the BUG check in __vmx_handle_exit(), but make it apply only to KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING.

Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/al3Qbq-jUYE-_72N@192.168.1.215/ 

 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 4d2bacd00ec4..f54757bd8382 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5096,7 +5096,7 @@ static int svm_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
 		goto unmap_save;
 
 	ret = 0;
-	vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending = KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING;
+	vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending = KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING_UNTRUSTED;
 
 unmap_save:
 	kvm_vcpu_unmap(vcpu, &map_save);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index cc75feec05da..333072cc9bce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6720,7 +6720,8 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
 	 * invalid guest state should never happen as that means KVM knowingly
 	 * allowed a nested VM-Enter with an invalid vmcs12.  More below.
 	 */
-	if (KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending, vcpu->kvm))
+	if (KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending == KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING,
+		       vcpu->kvm))
 		return -EIO;
 
 	if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
@@ -8436,7 +8437,7 @@ int vmx_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const union kvm_smram *smram)
 		if (ret != NVMX_VMENTRY_SUCCESS)
 			return 1;
 
-		vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending = KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING;
+		vcpu->arch.nested_run_pending = KVM_NESTED_RUN_PENDING_UNTRUSTED;
 		vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
 	}
 	return 0;

base-commit: 58717b2a1365d06c8c64b72aa948541b53fe31eb
-- 
2.15.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-07-21  6:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-21  6:08 Hao Zhang [this message]
2026-07-21  6:24 ` [PATCH v2] KVM: x86: Mark nested RSM-created VM-Enter as untrusted sashiko-bot
2026-07-21 14:42   ` Sean Christopherson

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