From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
Cc: peterhuewe@gmx.de, jgg@ziepe.ca, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] tpm: use kfree_sensitive() for context and session buffers
Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2026 21:39:31 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alvIY-6-NtgH0pzR@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260716000355.13825-1-skunkolee@gmail.com>
On Wed, Jul 15, 2026 at 06:03:55PM -0600, Ivy Lopez wrote:
> The context_buf and session_buf fields in struct tpm_space contain
> TPM context blobs which may include sensitive cryptographic material.
> Use kfree_sensitive() instead of kfree() to ensure the memory is
> zeroed before being freed, consistent with how chip->auth is handled
> in the same tpm_dev_release() function since commit c424d2664f08
> ("tpm: Use kfree_sensitive() to free auth session in tpm_dev_release()")
>
> Signed-off-by: Ivy Lopez <skunkolee@gmail.com>
> ---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 4 ++--
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 6 +++---
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> index 12b7394b34bd..6f16fc358175 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
> @@ -244,8 +244,8 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev)
> idr_remove(&dev_nums_idr, chip->dev_num);
> mutex_unlock(&idr_lock);
>
> - kfree(chip->work_space.context_buf);
> - kfree(chip->work_space.session_buf);
> + kfree_sensitive(chip->work_space.context_buf);
> + kfree_sensitive(chip->work_space.session_buf);
> #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC
> kfree_sensitive(chip->auth);
> #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> index 60354cd53b5c..a7200e6dc462 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ int tpm2_init_space(struct tpm_space *space, unsigned int buf_size)
>
> space->session_buf = kzalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (space->session_buf == NULL) {
> - kfree(space->context_buf);
> + kfree_sensitive(space->context_buf);
> /* Prevent caller getting a dangling pointer. */
> space->context_buf = NULL;
> return -ENOMEM;
> @@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ void tpm2_del_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space)
> tpm_put_ops(chip);
> }
>
> - kfree(space->context_buf);
> - kfree(space->session_buf);
> + kfree_sensitive(space->context_buf);
> + kfree_sensitive(space->session_buf);
> }
>
> int tpm2_load_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf,
> --
> 2.55.0
>
Yep, as James said, there's no plain text to uncover.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-18 18:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-16 0:03 [PATCH] tpm: use kfree_sensitive() for context and session buffers Ivy Lopez
2026-07-16 12:26 ` James Bottomley
2026-07-18 18:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-07-18 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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