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From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	kernel-team@android.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	"open list:SELINUX SECURITY MODULE" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)"
	<bpf@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 22:07:10 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <amvLDoB4g7NMlf4R@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <db6fe5d2d4081f20f85abc6020b831fd@paul-moore.com>

On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 05:10:00PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Jul 30, 2026 Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com> wrote:
> > 
> > selinux_inode_init_security() marks the isec as initialized before
> > checking if mount labeling is supported (SBLABEL_MNT). This was fine
> > until commit 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs"),
> > where genfscon bpffs mounts fail the SBLABEL_MNT check as expected (no
> > xattrs) and yet leave the isec->initialized. This breaks subsequent
> > calls to inode_doinit_with_dentry().
> > 
> > Do the SBLABEL_MNT check before the inode security is initialized.
> > 
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/akWdcp6P0FkNDzBk@google.com/
> > Fixes: 9722955b5430 ("bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs")
> > Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++----
> >  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index 8d6945edae7a..09a12eb8652c 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -2980,6 +2980,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
> >  	if (rc)
> >  		return rc;
> >  
> > +	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
> > +	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
> > +		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> 
> If we're moving this check, we should probably just move it to right
> after we assign 'sbsec' at the top of the function.  The calls to
> inode_mode_to_security() and selinux_determine_inode_label() aren't
> doing anything useful in either the !selinux_initialized() or !SBLABEL_MNT
> cases so let's avoid the unnecessary work.

Ha! That is a really good point. Let me move the check further up then.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-30 22:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-02  7:40 [PATCH vfs/vfs-7.2.xattr v3] bpf: Add simple xattr support to bpffs Daniel Borkmann
2026-06-02 18:07 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-06-02 18:25   ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-06-03  7:07 ` Christian Brauner
2026-07-01 23:06   ` Carlos Llamas
2026-07-10 12:17     ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-07-30 18:10       ` [PATCH] selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init Carlos Llamas
2026-07-30 18:18         ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-30 18:50         ` Stephen Smalley
2026-07-30 21:10         ` Paul Moore
2026-07-30 22:07           ` Carlos Llamas [this message]
2026-07-30 22:15           ` [PATCH v2] " Carlos Llamas
2026-07-30 22:23             ` sashiko-bot

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