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From: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, qemu-riscv@nongnu.org,
	qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org,
	qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/28] hw: define most common PCI types as secure
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 17:50:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aqQxXXs4_NfDdkim@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911143627.2743803-16-berrange@redhat.com>

On Fri, Sep 11, 2026 at 03:36:14PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> Essentially all PCI infrastructure is in scope for the virtualization
> use case, aside from the niche simba bridge.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
> ---
>  hw/pci-bridge/gen_pcie_root_port.c  | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/i82801b11.c           | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/ioh3420.c             | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/pci_bridge_dev.c      | 2 ++
>  hw/pci-bridge/pci_expander_bridge.c | 8 ++++++++
>  hw/pci-bridge/pcie_pci_bridge.c     | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/pcie_root_port.c      | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/xio3130_downstream.c  | 1 +
>  hw/pci-bridge/xio3130_upstream.c    | 1 +
>  hw/pci/pci.c                        | 7 +++++++
>  hw/pci/pci_bridge.c                 | 1 +
>  hw/pci/pci_host.c                   | 1 +
>  hw/pci/pcie_host.c                  | 1 +
>  hw/pci/pcie_port.c                  | 1 +
>  14 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
> 

> diff --git a/hw/pci-bridge/pci_expander_bridge.c b/hw/pci-bridge/pci_expander_bridge.c
> index 40ffbc4e08..bd5598b639 100644
> --- a/hw/pci-bridge/pci_expander_bridge.c
> +++ b/hw/pci-bridge/pci_expander_bridge.c

snip

> @@ -128,6 +130,7 @@ static const TypeInfo pxb_cxl_bus_info = {
>      .parent        = TYPE_CXL_BUS,
>      .instance_size = sizeof(PXBBus),
>      .class_init    = pxb_bus_class_init,
> +    .secure        = true,
>  };
>  

snip

>  static void pxb_cxl_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
> @@ -249,6 +253,7 @@ static const TypeInfo cxl_host_info = {
>      .parent        = TYPE_PCI_HOST_BRIDGE,
>      .instance_size = sizeof(CXLHost),
>      .class_init    = pxb_cxl_host_class_init,
> +    .secure        = true,
>  };
>  
>  /*

snip

> @@ -540,6 +547,7 @@ static const TypeInfo pxb_cxl_dev_info = {
>      .parent        = TYPE_PXB_PCIE_DEV,
>      .instance_size = sizeof(PXBCXLDev),
>      .class_init    = pxb_cxl_dev_class_init,
> +    .secure        = true,
>      .interfaces =
>          (const InterfaceInfo[]){
>              { INTERFACE_CONVENTIONAL_PCI_DEVICE },

These three were a mistake. No CXL code is intended to be classed as
secure at this time.


With regards,
Daniel
-- 
|: https://berrange.com       ~~        https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :|
|: https://libvirt.org          ~~          https://entangle-photo.org :|
|: https://pixelfed.art/berrange   ~~    https://fstop138.berrange.com :|



  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-11 16:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-11 14:35 [PATCH 00/28] Mark user creatable devices for secure for virt use case Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 01/28] hw: mark secure machines for x86, s390, ppc, arm, loonarch, riscv Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 02/28] accel: mark kvm and xen accelerators as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 03/28] hw: mark all virtio PCI devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 04/28] hw: mark all virtio CCW " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 05/28] hw: mark all vhost devices a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 06/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 07/28] hw/vfio: mark all VFIO object classes " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 08/28] hw/xen: mark all Xen related object types as being secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 09/28] hw/net: mark e1000, e1000e, IGB, rtl8139 & sPAPR VLAN as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 10/28] hw/usb: mark commonly used USB devices/hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 11/28] hw/watchdog: mark some watchdog devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 12/28] hw/scsi: mark spapr and vmware SCSI controllers " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 13/28] hw/scsi: mark SCSI disk endpoint devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 14/28] hw/ide: mark ICH9 and ide-hd/ide-cd " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 15/28] hw: define most common PCI types " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 16:50   ` Daniel P. Berrangé [this message]
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 16/28] hw/pci-host: mark common x86, ppc, arm and s390 PCI hosts " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 17/28] hw/display: mark bochs, cirrus, qxl, VGA, ramfb " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 18/28] hw/tpm: mark all TPM implementations " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 19/28] hw/misc: mark pvpanic, vmcoreinfo " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 20/28] hw/audio: mark Intel HDA devices & codecs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 21/28] hw/char: mark common serial / console devicess a secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 22/28] hw/mem: mark nvdimm, pc-dimm & spapr-nvdimm devices as secure Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 23/28] hw/uefi: mark the EFI vars service " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 24/28] hw/acpi: mark erst, vmclock and vmgenid devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 25/28] hw: mark KVM clock and RTC " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 26/28] hw: device AMD, Intel and ARM IOMMUs " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 27/28] hw/input: mark PS/2 and PC Keyboard devices " Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-09-11 14:36 ` [PATCH 28/28] hw/i386: mark vmmouse / vmport " Daniel P. Berrangé

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