From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Adriano Cordova <adrianox@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] security: commoncap: clarify CAP_FS_SET comment in cap_task_fix_setuid()
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 12:02:59 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <arK0w65j4F2M3e+o@hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260921025209.1023530-1-adrianox@gmail.com>
On Sun, Sep 20, 2026 at 11:52:08PM -0300, Adriano Cordova wrote:
> CAP_FS_SET is exactly the set of capabilities that an fsuid of 0
> historically granted (see CAP_FS_MASK in include/linux/capability.h),
> so cap_task_fix_setuid() drops that set from the effective set when
> fsuid leaves 0. Replace the stale FIXME with this explanation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Adriano Cordova <adrianox@gmail.com>
lgtm, thanks.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
If I don't see objections soon, I can merge it into the caps-next
tree.
thanks,
-serge
> ---
> v2: reword the comment to something more concise.
>
> security/commoncap.c | 10 ++++++----
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 3399535808fe..1ba2ea2651fc 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -1169,11 +1169,13 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
> break;
>
> case LSM_SETID_FS:
> - /* juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
> - * otherwise suppressed
> + /* Juggle the capabilities to follow FSUID changes, unless
> + * otherwise suppressed.
> *
> - * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
> - * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
> + * CAP_FS_SET is exactly the set of capabilities that an
> + * fsuid of 0 historically granted (see CAP_FS_MASK in
> + * <linux/capability.h>), so we drop that set when fsuid
> + * leaves 0.
> */
> if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
> kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
> --
> 2.51.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-22 17:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-21 2:52 [PATCH v2] security: commoncap: clarify CAP_FS_SET comment in cap_task_fix_setuid() Adriano Cordova
2026-09-21 2:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-22 17:02 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=arK0w65j4F2M3e+o@hallyn.com \
--to=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=adrianox@gmail.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.