From: Richard Patel <ripatel@wii.dev>
To: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"tglx@kernel.org" <tglx@kernel.org>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"kees@kernel.org" <kees@kernel.org>,
"shuah@kernel.org" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] x86/shstk: ban ia32 sigreturn when shadow stack is enabled
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 21:50:06 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <asgQDlpnDwu04oZc@wii.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e1a26ac75c39673d043b2860f848827fecbcb843.camel@intel.com>
On Thu, Oct 08, 2026 at 08:59:57PM +0000, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote:
> On Thu, 2026-10-08 at 20:16 +0000, Richard Patel wrote:
> > When returning from a signal via x32 or x64 rt_sigreturn, the
> > shadow-stack-restore token is validated, but ia32 (rt_)sigreturn
> > do not call restore_signal_shadow_stack().
> >
> > With IA32_EMULATION, 'int $0x80' allows ia32 sigreturn in 64-bit
> > mode, which could defeat sigreturn protection.
> >
> > Refuse ia32 sigreturn by forcing a SIGSEGV instead.
>
> How can it defeat protection? If doesn't process the shadow stack sigframe at
> all, leaving the SSP where ever it was originally. What am I missing?
The selftest demonstrates that 'int $0x80' rt_sigreturn from 64-bit mode
jumps to an arbitrary %eip in the signal frame (zero-extended to %rip), \
whereas the 'syscall' variant raises SIGSEGV if %rip is corrupt.
I don't think it matters that SSP is still at the old place. It would
only break 'ret' after sigreturn, but the problem is that the sigreturn
itself is a wild jump.
"defeat protection" was badly worded, I just meant that the 'syscall'
path has protections that the 'int $0x80' path doesn't have, so I
thought it'd be worth fixing.
I might be missing something, maybe SHSTK never intended to defend
against a wild sigreturn? Either way, it's not a security thing.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-08 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-08 20:16 [PATCH 0/3] x86/shstk: ban ia32 sigreturn Richard Patel
2026-10-08 20:16 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/shstk: ban ia32 sigreturn when shadow stack is enabled Richard Patel
2026-10-08 20:59 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-10-08 21:50 ` Richard Patel [this message]
2026-10-08 22:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-10-08 22:47 ` Richard Patel
2026-10-08 23:11 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-10-08 23:29 ` Richard Patel
2026-10-09 11:36 ` Richard Patel
2026-10-09 22:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-10-08 20:16 ` [PATCH 2/3] selftests/x86: test shadow stack sigreturn protection Richard Patel
2026-10-08 20:16 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/x86: skip shstk tests where perf_event_open() fails Richard Patel
2026-10-08 21:00 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86/shstk: ban ia32 sigreturn Edgecombe, Rick P
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