Re: [PATCH v3 1/6] docs: Mention security considerations for NBD

["Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 09:53:57AM -0600, Eric Blake wrote:
> Document a policy that NBD connections should strongly consider using
> TLS and x509 certificates to filter out unwanted clients.  If a
> malicious server or client can trigger a QEMU assertion failure on a
> plaintext connection, but can trivially have risk mitigated by
> enabling TLS to weed out unknown partners (so that a full-on attack of
> QEMU would first require chaining some other attack to convince a
> "trusted" client to break protocol in the first place), then that
> reduces the CVSS-BE score of the QEMU bug. In turn, our policy already
> states that low severity scores can be fixed without an embargo.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
> 
> ---
> v3: more wording tweaks, since even a TLS-authorized partner cannot
> be considered 100% trusted, but is reduced risk.
> ---
>  docs/system/security.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>


With regards,
Daniel
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