From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 38A5F606A33A for ; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:34:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=FvC8K3Dc Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xRpYB-0005F7-8n; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 06:34:36 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xRpY8-0005E9-UP for qemu-arm@nongnu.org; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 06:34:33 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xRpY5-0006Zn-CE for qemu-arm@nongnu.org; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 06:34:32 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1794569661; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=a/BEVsonILxV5iw1I+Tm4GO4wkElnz67stj/oy9XOM8=; b=FvC8K3Dc3aibdTChLzvbaggth0I90CXHe2cB0BJz4oq3iGsPNmjiVEPDfp9DdzSAYuku8Y TotmiZLtrRchy7/qOMXuA1ieVYU1gGUQUVsjbxNOE7riS13vBlj4mNJmhQ/1tJzctGpP3F nshdwn8QqUbdxMFsBLTjCno/dVQQ6k0= Received: from mx-prod-mc-06.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-35-165-154-97.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [35.165.154.97]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-389-W3t1WKBRNi63phywrCpRNw-1; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 06:34:06 -0500 X-MC-Unique: W3t1WKBRNi63phywrCpRNw-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: W3t1WKBRNi63phywrCpRNw_1794569644 Received: from mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.4]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-06.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC7AE1800595; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:34:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (headnet04.pony-001.prod.iad2.dc.redhat.com [10.2.32.116]) by mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AFC2830001B9; Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:34:00 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 11:33:57 +0000 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: Alex =?utf-8?Q?Benn=C3=A9e?= Cc: =?utf-8?Q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9?= Lureau , Thomas Huth , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, qemu-arm@nongnu.org, Peter Maydell , Paolo Bonzini , qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, qemu-block@nongnu.org, qemu-riscv@nongnu.org, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/28] hw: mark all remaining virtio object types as secure Message-ID: References: <20261029131241.2275706-1-berrange@redhat.com> <20261029131241.2275706-5-berrange@redhat.com> <87ik21asn4.fsf@draig.linaro.org> X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <87ik21asn4.fsf@draig.linaro.org> User-Agent: Mutt/2.4.3 (2026-10-09) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.30.177.4 X-Mimecast-MFC-PROC-ID: bWgrQ-kMeGFdW5DvHIACizdV5ohaQcOMdoz2ZDe3R_A_1794569644 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -27 X-Spam_score: -2.8 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.8 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-arm@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Sender: qemu-arm-bounces+qemu-arm=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 11:16:15AM +0000, Alex Bennée wrote: > Daniel P. Berrangé writes: > > > Alex, as the virtio-gpu* maintainer can you give your opinion > > on the discussion below about virtio-gpu security tagging > > vs our current security policy for "virtualization use case" > > to ack/nack the proposal. > > I'm inclined to agree with Marc-Andre here - the 3D GPU attack surface > is large and for the in-QEMU handling we have a bunch of issues with GPU > context handling between threads that make it tricky. Compounding that > ruttabaga is not very well tested at all because its hard to enable > without non-distro libs (for now). > > Finally virtio-gpu is Odd Fixes so it's not getting the response times > of other VirtIO stuff in terms of handling security issues. > > We should encourage users to use vhost-user-gpu for 3D stuff because at > least then the rendering pipeline and processing of guest controlled > data is easier to sandbox. > > So I'd say: > > - virtio-gpu for 2d - OK > - virtio-gpu for 3d via vhost - OK > - virtio-gpu for 3d in QEMU - Not OK So, IIUC, in terms of what -device help reports, that would mean Secure: name "vhost-user-gpu", bus virtio-bus name "vhost-user-gpu-pci", bus PCI name "virtio-gpu-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu" Not secure: name "virtio-gpu-gl-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-gl-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-gl" name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-device", bus virtio-bus name "virtio-gpu-rutabaga-pci", bus PCI, alias "virtio-gpu-rutabaga" ? > > Alex. > > > > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 05:33:31PM +0000, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > >> On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:52:27PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: > >> > Hi > >> > > >> > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 6:40 PM Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > >> > > > >> > > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 06:35:29PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: > >> > > > Hi > >> > > > > >> > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 3:53 PM Thomas Huth wrote: > >> > > > > > >> > > > > On 29/10/2026 14.12, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > >> > > > > > These are all intended for use in a virtualization scenario and must > >> > > > > > provide a security boundary. > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau > >> > > > > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé > >> > > > > > --- > >> > > > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > I have a second thought about this, I'd like to exclude all > >> > > > gpu-accelerated paths for now. virgl/mesa/rutabaga expose a very large > >> > > > attack surface, so I'd like to drop them from the secure boundary > >> > > > >> > > Rather than repost, please see my response for patch 2: > >> > > > >> > > https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2026-11/msg01530.html > >> > > > >> > > TL;DR: we have already promised anything virtio related is in scope > >> > > for security handling for a long time, as they are all unambiguously > >> > > "virtualization use case". > >> > > > >> > > >> > the value of a secure policy enforcement is low if we know those > >> > devices are unsecure and don't have the resources to make them secure. > >> > >> It isn't a great situation to be in, but we're already there for any > >> virtio devices based on our existing policies for bug handling and > >> security triage. We can't promise we'll get fixes for all CVEs quickly, > >> but we will at least assign CVEs so that users are aware when there > >> are known problems. > >> > >> This contrasts to other devices where problems will remain largely > >> hidden for view, as we treat them as normal bugs and never call our > >> security concerns when committing changes. > >> > >> With regards, > >> Daniel > >> -- > >> |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| > >> |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| > >> |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :| > >> > >> > > > > With regards, > > Daniel > > -- > Alex Bennée > Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro > With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|