All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
To: Sergei Nizovtsev <snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
	Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:07:40 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avrj_GrUbKNjDXz6@lima-development> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261111203614.1221188-1-snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>

On Wed, Nov 11, 2026 at 09:35:52PM +0100, Sergei Nizovtsev wrote:
> The backing_file_alloc and backing_file_free LSM hooks get the backing
> file as "struct file *backing_file", but its f_path is not populated
> while they run:
> 
>  - security_backing_file_alloc() is called from init_backing_file() in
>    alloc_empty_backing_file(), before vfs_open() sets f_path, so
>    backing_file->f_path.dentry is NULL;
>  - security_backing_file_free() can run for a backing file whose open
>    failed and whose f_path was already cleared.
> 
> Neither hook is listed in untrusted_lsm_hooks, so bpf_lsm_is_trusted()
> lets BPF LSM programs use the argument as a trusted pointer.  A program
> attached to lsm/backing_file_alloc can pass &backing_file->f_path to the
> trusted-args kfunc bpf_path_d_path(), and d_path() dereferences the NULL
> dentry on the first open of a file on overlayfs:
> 
>   extern int bpf_path_d_path(const struct path *path, char *buf,
>                              size_t sz) __ksym;
>   char buf[256];
> 
>   SEC("lsm/backing_file_alloc")
>   int BPF_PROG(poc, struct file *backing_file,
>                const struct file *user_file)
>   {
>           bpf_path_d_path(&backing_file->f_path, buf, sizeof(buf));
>           return 0;
>   }
> 
>   # bpftool prog load poc.bpf.o /sys/fs/bpf/poc autoattach
>   # cat <any file on an overlayfs mount>
> 
>   Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
>   KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
>   RIP: 0010:d_path+0xb4/0x810
>   Call Trace:
>    bpf_path_d_path+0x26/0x70
>    bpf_prog_f8f2e241d4ff7217_poc+0x33/0x37
>    bpf_trampoline_6442521065+0x61/0xf9
>    security_backing_file_alloc+0x78/0xe0
>    alloc_empty_backing_file+0xf0/0x170
>    backing_file_open+0xfd/0x290
>    ovl_open_realfile+0x1ed/0x270
>    ovl_open+0x1a9/0x2f0
>    do_dentry_open+0x404/0x1280
>    vfs_open_consume+0xba/0x4b0
>    path_openat+0xc4f/0x1f60
> 
> Add both hooks to untrusted_lsm_hooks, next to file_alloc_security and
> file_free_security, which are listed there for the same reason.  The
> program above is then rejected at load time with "R1 must be referenced
> or trusted".

I literally had a patch queued up and was just about to send it out for
review. Thank you for this.

> Fixes: 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5-2
> Signed-off-by: Sergei Nizovtsev <snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com>
> ---
> Tested on bpf.git master (475a0cfd02f1) under virtme-ng with KASAN: the
> reproducer oopses without the patch and fails to load with it. Only the
> backing_file_alloc case was reproduced; backing_file_free is from code
> reading.
> 
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 ++
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> index f58dce888ff4a..f39a3766f2245 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
> @@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_alloc)
> +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_free)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security)
>  BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security)
> -- 
> 2.56.0
> 

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-16 11:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-11 20:35 [PATCH bpf] bpf, lsm: Mark backing_file_alloc/free LSM hooks as untrusted Sergei Nizovtsev
2026-11-11 21:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-14  6:10 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2026-11-16 11:07 ` Matt Bobrowski [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=avrj_GrUbKNjDXz6@lima-development \
    --to=matt@bobrowski.net \
    --cc=amir73il@gmail.com \
    --cc=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
    --cc=emil@etsalapatis.com \
    --cc=ihor.solodrai@linux.dev \
    --cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
    --cc=memxor@gmail.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=snizovtsev@cloudlinux.com \
    --cc=song@kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.