From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: Juan Agustin Niccolini <juanagusnicco@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] tcp_metrics: hash the destination address with SipHash
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 00:36:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avuhR7Epvtgu--iT@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261112064624.15245-1-juanagusnicco@gmail.com>
On Thu, 12 Nov 2026 01:46:24 -0500, Juan Agustin Niccolini wrote:
> The tcp_metrics bucket is derived from a fold of the peer address.
> For IPv4 the fold is ipv4_addr_hash(), which returns the address
> unchanged. For IPv6 it is ipv6_addr_hash(), which XORs the four
> 32-bit words of the address. net_hash_mix() is only XORed in after
> that fold, so two addresses of either family with the same fold share
> a bucket in every netns.
>
> A host owning an IPv6 /64 can thus compute, without knowing
> net_hash_mix(), addresses that collide with a chosen IPv4 or IPv6 peer:
>
> w3 = w2 ^ p0 ^ p1 ^ target /* p0, p1: prefix, w2: free */
>
> A bucket holds six entries and the seventh insert replaces the oldest.
> An off-path host can fill a peer's bucket with its own entries and
> later tell whether one was evicted, because tcp_init_metrics() seeds
> the initial RTO from the cached RTT. This reveals whether that peer,
> or another address in the same bucket, connected in the meantime.
> XOR and multiply is not a PRF, so net_hash_mix() can be recovered the
> same way, after which evictions leak about 14 bits of any client's
> address, depending on the number of buckets.
>
> Hash the address with SipHash and a random key instead, as commit
> 2ee66e948717 ("inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash")
> did for inet_peer. net_hash_mix() and hash_32() are kept, to separate
> namespaces and to reduce the result to the table size.
>
> Fixes: 51c5d0c4b169 ("tcp: Maintain dynamic metrics in local cache.")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Juan Agustin Niccolini <juanagusnicco@gmail.com>
> ---
> This can be exploited remotely to recover a client's IPv4 address.
> A single host narrows the address to about 262 thousand candidates,
> and because each netns keys the hash differently, intersecting buckets
> extracted from multiple hosts converges quickly into one candidate;
> 3-5 are enough. The net_hash_mix() value only needs to be extracted
> once per boot per host.
>
> Many common cases facilitate this. For instance, a browser loading
> one page connects to several hosts within the same second. That
> supplies the buckets needed to converge, and the shared timing shows
> they belong to the same client.
>
> I reproduced the bug on a QEMU guest running mainline (2a500a04d6f9) and
> against Ubuntu 24.04 over the internet. With the patch applied, the
> reproducer no longer finds addresses that share a bucket. The
> reproducer is available on request.
>
> For stable: 5.10 and 5.15 lack siphash_aligned_key_t;
> "static siphash_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly __aligned(16);" can
> be used there.
>
> This bug was discovered during an LLM-based code review.
>
> net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
> #include <linux/init.h>
> #include <linux/tcp.h>
> #include <linux/hash.h>
> +#include <linux/siphash.h>
> #include <linux/tcp_metrics.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>
> @@ -94,6 +95,23 @@
>
> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_metrics_lock);
> static DEFINE_SEQLOCK(fastopen_seqlock);
> +
> +static siphash_aligned_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly;
> +
> +static u32 tcpm_addr_hash(const struct inetpeer_addr *a)
> +{
> + net_get_random_once(&tcpm_hash_key, sizeof(tcpm_hash_key));
> +
> + if (a->family == AF_INET)
> + return siphash_2u32((__force u32)a->a4.addr, a->a4.vif,
Isn't a->a4.vif always zero ?
> + &tcpm_hash_key);
> +
> + return siphash_4u32((__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[0],
> + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[1],
> + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[2],
> + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[3],
> + &tcpm_hash_key);
> +}
>
> static void tcpm_suck_dst(struct tcp_metrics_block *tm,
> const struct dst_entry *dst,
> @@ -270,13 +288,13 @@
> case AF_INET:
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_loc_addr);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr);
> - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr);
> + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
> break;
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> case AF_INET6:
> inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_loc_addr);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
> - hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
> + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
> break;
> #endif
> default:
> @@ -310,18 +328,18 @@
> if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
> - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
> + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
> }
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
> if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
> - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
> + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
> } else {
> inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr);
> - hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&sk->sk_v6_daddr);
> + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
> }
> }
> #endif
> @@ -818,7 +836,7 @@
> if (a) {
> inetpeer_set_addr_v4(addr, nla_get_in_addr(a));
> if (hash)
> - *hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v4(addr));
> + *hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr);
> return 0;
> }
> a = info->attrs[v6];
> @@ -828,7 +846,7 @@
> in6 = nla_get_in6_addr(a);
> inetpeer_set_addr_v6(addr, &in6);
> if (hash)
> - *hash = ipv6_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v6(addr));
> + *hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr);
> return 0;
> }
> return optional ? 1 : -EAFNOSUPPORT;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 0:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-12 6:46 [PATCH net] tcp_metrics: hash the destination address with SipHash Juan Agustin Niccolini
2026-11-17 0:36 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2026-11-17 3:47 ` Juan Agustín Nicco
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