From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Ada Smith <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
Hungyu Lin <dennylin0707@gmail.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 16:41:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <avx1r36MHsxhAzSf@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101157.2520463-4-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:53AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> A process in a domain that denies CAP_SETPCAP could still add
> capabilities outside of its permitted set to its inheritable set with
> capset(2), if it held CAP_SETPCAP. cap_capset() checks CAP_SETPCAP with
> cap_capable() in cap_inh_is_capped(), so the check never reaches
> hook_capable(). Through file inheritable capabilities, such a set can
> grant new permitted capabilities on execve() when no_new_privs is not
> set, which is possible for a domain enforced by a task holding
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
>
> Add a Landlock capset hook that checks CAP_SETPCAP against the domain
> under the same condition as cap_capset(). As with the mmap_addr hook,
> LSMs implement their own policy in this hook: SELinux checks capset with
> its own permission.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>
> Changes since v1:
> https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-4-mic@digikod.net
> - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by.
> ---
> security/landlock/cap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/cap.c b/security/landlock/cap.c
> index 10e1ca772b9c..c89e8d76db8c 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/cap.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/cap.c
> @@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ static int hook_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> return check_cap(cred, cap, opts);
> }
>
> +/**
> + * hook_capset - Restrict inheritable capability changes
> + *
> + * @new: New credentials (unused).
> + * @old: Current credentials.
> + * @effective: New effective set (unused).
> + * @inheritable: New inheritable set.
> + * @permitted: New permitted set (unused).
> + *
> + * cap_capset() requires CAP_SETPCAP to add inheritable capabilities that are
> + * not in the old permitted set, but calls cap_capable() directly, which skips
> + * hook_capable().
It has taken me a bit of time to wrap my head around this one.
cap_capset() starts with:
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
where cap_inh_is_capped() returns true if it does *not* have CAP_SETPCAP.
So when this Landlock hooks gets called, cap_capset() has already
checked that we either have CAP_SETPCAP or inheritable ⊆
(old->inheritable ⋃ old->permitted). So the Landlock hook can check
for the cap_issubset(...) condition to see whether CAP_SETPCAP had to
be "used".
Maybe it would be easier to phrase it like that?
(A more specific nit about this comment, "calls cap_capable()
*directly*" has confused me a bit, since cap_capset() calls
cap_capable() only *indirectly* through cap_inh_is_capped(). Maybe
"promptly", or "immediately" would be better?)
> Check the same condition against the domain. commoncap runs
> + * first, so this only sees requests that commoncap allowed. capset(2) discards
> + * @new if this hook fails, so nothing is committed.
> + *
> + * Return: 0 if allowed, -EPERM if CAP_SETPCAP use is denied.
> + */
> +static int hook_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
> + const kernel_cap_t *effective,
> + const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
> + const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
> +{
> + if (cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> + cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, old->cap_permitted)))
> + return 0;
> +
> + return check_cap(old, CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE);
> +}
> +
> /**
> * hook_mmap_addr - Restrict mappings below dac_mmap_min_addr
> *
> @@ -113,6 +142,7 @@ static int hook_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
>
> static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, hook_capable),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, hook_capset),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, hook_mmap_addr),
> };
>
> --
> 2.56.0
>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Code checks out, only minor comments about the documentation. It has
taken me a bit to understand how the Landlock hook's logic matches the
one in cap_capset().
—Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 15:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:11 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of commoncap's capability checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] landlock: Factor out capability denial checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 13:56 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 14:23 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:41 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:43 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 16:11 ` Günther Noack
2026-11-17 10:11 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 16:25 ` Günther Noack
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=avx1r36MHsxhAzSf@google.com \
--to=gnoack@google.com \
--cc=adasmithgt@gmail.com \
--cc=dennylin0707@gmail.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=josef@toxicpanda.com \
--cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mic@digikod.net \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.