From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D42B8606A88A for ; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:57:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=hpe6/doM Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xTKd0-0005oy-6h; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:57:46 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xTKcy-0005oT-Ln for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:57:44 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1xTKcx-0000ec-0c for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:57:44 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1794927462; h=from:from:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=s9JYdlZdFabNw7qL1F5zQ3pQ6ZpMO7APWPC1D7efmvw=; b=hpe6/doMQsJEh8wHKZt7ibHwfn88GN6cwpc9rr2qw4SajOUCBLYnfP0Vi+g0/0Kutmc7mF Zj0jBtNZ1fO6DPq9QbilFic2JYlqkXZYoAHFx8P3A8Epj7stzPiwiLFDDVNCz2HX1DLQ6C IgnJhNYrzMAqrCvvVJdQQfBYENEfGB8= Received: from mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-455-CtEfAtWBOS-QB8kpDlYiIA-1; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:57:38 -0500 X-MC-Unique: CtEfAtWBOS-QB8kpDlYiIA-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: CtEfAtWBOS-QB8kpDlYiIA_1794927457 Received: from mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.12]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A258A1956050; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:57:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from redhat.com (headnet04.pony-001.prod.iad2.dc.redhat.com [10.2.32.116]) by mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 903A11956054; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:57:36 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:57:33 +0000 From: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= To: =?utf-8?Q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9?= Lureau Cc: Peter Maydell , qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: Re: System emulator security boundary policy now enforceable Message-ID: References: X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/2.4.3 (2026-10-09) X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.12 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=berrange@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: 5 X-Spam_score: 0.5 X-Spam_bar: / X-Spam_report: (0.5 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H5=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_SBL_CSS=3.335, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: Daniel =?utf-8?B?UC4gQmVycmFuZ8Op?= Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 06:55:17PM +0400, Marc-André Lureau wrote: > Hi > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 2:36 PM Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 10:24:26AM +0000, Peter Maydell wrote: > > > On Tue, 17 Nov 2026 at 10:10, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > > > > > > > > With the latest pull request of mine that is merged, we now have > > > > the mechanism for enforcement of the QEMU security boundary policy > > > > with annotations completed across QOM classes for machine types, > > > > devices and accelerators. > > > > > > > > For a bug disclosure affecting a system emulator to be accepted > > > > as a security flaw the reproducer scenario must now pass without > > > > warnings when adding the '-compat insecure-input' flag. > > > > > > How does the marking work? I'm confused about what's going > > > on with the pl011 UART (which is on the security boundary > > > because the arm virt board uses it). Unlike hw/char/serial.c > > > and some others, there's no ".secure = true" in hw/char/pl011.c. > > > But it isn't being rejected by > > > ./build/kvmonly/qemu-system-aarch64 -accel kvm -M virt -display none > > > -compat insecure-input=reject -serial stdio > > > > > > so presumably we have figured out it's secure somehow. What's > > > the mechanism here? > > > > Currently we've only marked things which are explicitly user > > creatable. ie they appear in '-machine help', '-accel help' > > or '-device help' lists. > > > > If a machine type is marked as secure, then implicitly devices > > which are built-in for that machine are also considered secure. > > Similarly if a device is marked as secure, then implicitly > > any QOM parents of that device are also secure. > > > > In the next release cycle, I want to explicitly mark the > > built-in devices to make this clear to developers, and also > > explicitly mark parent types. > > > > Then code can explicitly validate the built-in devices & parents, > > so that we can detect if someone adds something inappropriate > > in our security boundary without realizing implications. > > We also need to cover devices created via -vga, -nic, -usbdevice, -audio > > I am not sure how to approach this though. Should we make all the > object_new() path faillible? Or use a top-down solution? > > I'd favour the bottom-up approach so we can properly check all objects > instantiations and fix as needed Once we get all parents marked, and all machine type built-in device marked, then we can move the check into the Device 'realize' path and catch everything. With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com ~~ https://hachyderm.io/@berrange :| |: https://libvirt.org ~~ https://entangle-photo.org :| |: https://pixelfed.art/berrange ~~ https://fstop138.berrange.com :|