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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:53:10 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awHMdgo7DbzfLXcj@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awHLt1IpLcqxUnDW@kernel.org>

On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 06:50:03PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 06:09:53PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 02:08:21AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > Configuring UID, GID, and project ID mappings currently requires writing
> > > formatted text to /proc/<pid>/{uid_map,gid_map,projid_map,setgroups},
> > > which depends on a live task in /proc and enforces write(2) file-opener
> > > CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID checks that prevent passing an unprivileged userns
> > > file descriptor over SCM_RIGHTS to a dedicated CAP_SETUID/CAP_SETGID
> > > mapping helper.
> > > 
> > > Add userns_set_idmap() to atomically configure setgroups policy and UID,
> > > GID, and project ID extents directly on a CLONE_NEWUSER nsfs file
> > > descriptor. Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the target user namespace in
> > > either the caller's or the file opener's credentials, and check parent
> > > ID-range capabilities strictly against the caller's credentials.
> > > 
> > > Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> > 
> > I'll remove the flags. I forgot to remove them from final version.
> 
> userns_set_idmap() still has flags-parameter but it is gated:
> 
> 	if (flags & ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)
> 		return -EINVAL;
> 
> And used as a bitmask:
> 
> 	ns->flags = ns->flags & flags;

SYSCALL_DEFINE4(userns_set_idmap, int, fd,
                const struct userns_idmap __user *, map,
                size_t, size, unsigned int, flags)
{
        struct uid_gid_map new_uid = {}, new_gid = {}, new_projid = {};
        struct userns_idmap req = {};
        struct ns_common *ns_common;
        struct user_namespace *ns;
        unsigned long old_flags;
        struct file *filp;
        int ret;

        BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct userns_idmap) != USERNS_IDMAP_SIZE_VER0);

        if (flags & ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED)
                return -EINVAL;

        CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
        if (fd_empty(f))
                return -EBADF;

        filp = fd_file(f);
        if (!proc_ns_file(filp))
                return -EINVAL;

        ns_common = get_proc_ns(file_inode(filp));
        if (ns_common->ns_type != CLONE_NEWUSER)
                return -EINVAL;
        ns = to_user_ns(ns_common);

        if (!map || size < USERNS_IDMAP_SIZE_VER0)
                return -EINVAL;
        ret = copy_struct_from_user(&req, sizeof(req), map, size);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
        if (req.reserved)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (!req.nr_uid_extents != !req.uid_extents ||
            !req.nr_gid_extents != !req.gid_extents ||
            !req.nr_projid_extents != !req.projid_extents)
                return -EINVAL;
        if (!req.nr_uid_extents && !req.nr_gid_extents &&
            !req.nr_projid_extents)
                return -EINVAL;
        if ((flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) && !req.nr_gid_extents)
                return -EINVAL;

        if (!ns->parent)
                return -EPERM;
        if (current_user_ns() != ns && current_user_ns() != ns->parent)
                return -EPERM;

        if (req.nr_uid_extents || req.nr_gid_extents) {
                bool file_ok = (filp->f_cred->user_ns == ns ||
                                filp->f_cred->user_ns == ns->parent) &&
                               file_ns_capable(filp, ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);

                if (!ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !file_ok)
                        return -EPERM;
        }

        if (req.nr_uid_extents) {
                ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.uid_extents,
                                               req.nr_uid_extents, &new_uid);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_free;
        }
        if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
                ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.gid_extents,
                                               req.nr_gid_extents, &new_gid);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_free;
        }
        if (req.nr_projid_extents) {
                ret = parse_user_idmap_extents(req.projid_extents,
                                               req.nr_projid_extents,
                                               &new_projid);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_free;
        }

        mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
        old_flags = ns->flags;
        ret = -EPERM;

        if (req.nr_uid_extents && ns->uid_map.nr_extents != 0)
                goto out_unlock;
        if (req.nr_gid_extents && ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0)
                goto out_unlock;
        if (req.nr_projid_extents && ns->projid_map.nr_extents != 0)
                goto out_unlock;

        if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
                if ((flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED) &&
                    !(ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
                        goto out_unlock;
                if (!(flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED))
                        ns->flags &= ~USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED;
        }

        if (req.nr_uid_extents) {
                ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, CAP_SETUID, &new_uid,
                                           &ns->parent->uid_map);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_restore;
        }
        if (req.nr_gid_extents) {
                ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, CAP_SETGID, &new_gid,
                                           &ns->parent->gid_map);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_restore;
        }
        if (req.nr_projid_extents) {
                ret = prepare_caller_idmap(ns, -1, &new_projid,
                                           &ns->parent->projid_map);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto out_restore;
        }

        if (req.nr_uid_extents)
                commit_new_idmap(&ns->uid_map, &new_uid);
        if (req.nr_gid_extents)
                commit_new_idmap(&ns->gid_map, &new_gid);
        if (req.nr_projid_extents)
                commit_new_idmap(&ns->projid_map, &new_projid);

        mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
        return 0;

out_restore:
        ns->flags = old_flags;
out_unlock:
        mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
out_free:
        free_new_idmap(&new_uid);
        free_new_idmap(&new_gid);
        free_new_idmap(&new_projid);
        return ret;
}

Br, Jarkko


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 16:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21  0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:09   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:49     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 16:53       ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 15:58   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/25] proc: Implement ->set_rootns() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/25] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:47   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen

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