From: Chad Spensky <noreply@github.com>
To: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [bluez/bluez] b0c2f7: monitor: clamp max_len in print_packet
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2026 16:11:07 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bluez/bluez/push/refs/heads/1146334/000000-b0c2f7@github.com> (raw)
Branch: refs/heads/1146334
Home: https://github.com/bluez/bluez
Commit: b0c2f7dfc2a32a8479e9663db6e440795dc4b702
https://github.com/bluez/bluez/commit/b0c2f7dfc2a32a8479e9663db6e440795dc4b702
Author: Chad Spensky <chad@allthenticate.com>
Date: 2026-08-14 (Fri, 14 Aug 2026)
Changed paths:
M monitor/packet.c
Log Message:
-----------
monitor: clamp max_len in print_packet
print_packet() derives the snprintf() bound for the packet text from the
terminal width and never bounds it against the space left in line[]:
char line[LINE_MAX], ts_str[96], pid_str[140];
int col = num_columns();
...
int max_len = col - len - extra_len - ts_len - 3;
if (max_len <= 0) {
extra = NULL;
max_len = col - len - ts_len - 3;
}
n = snprintf(line + pos, max_len + 1, "%s%s",
label ? ": " : "", text);
max_len can leave range in both directions, and either aborts under
_FORTIFY_SOURCE with "*** buffer overflow detected ***: terminated":
- The existing max_len <= 0 recovery drops extra and recomputes, but if
the prefix alone exceeds the column budget the result is still
negative, and max_len + 1 then underflows when converted to size_t.
len includes the "comm[pid]: " prefix built from struct ucred, which
is only present when reading from the monitor socket, so this is
reachable at ordinary widths. On a host with a large kernel.pid_max
the pid is 7 digits, so a long process name plus a long label is
enough and btmon dies mid-capture. Replaying the same traffic from a
btsnoop file never reproduces it, because there is no ucred and hence
no prefix.
- col larger than sizeof(line) makes max_len + 1 exceed the remaining
buffer. LINE_MAX raised the bar but did not remove it.
A negative max_len is also used to index line[] when truncating the
text, writing before the start of the buffer, so this is an
out-of-bounds write and not only an abort.
The check only triggers at _FORTIFY_SOURCE=3; at =2 the runtime pos
offset defeats __builtin_object_size and the check is elided, which is
why this is mostly seen on distributions defaulting to =3.
Clamp max_len to the space remaining in line[], and only write the
ellipsis when there is room for it.
Reproduced and verified by building the current logic and the patched
logic with -O2 -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 and replaying a capture at a range of
terminal widths:
cols before after
10 abort ok
20 abort ok
40 abort ok
80 ok ok
200 ok ok
2000 ok ok
3000 abort ok
5000 abort ok
Reported-at: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1104
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reply other threads:[~2026-08-14 23:11 UTC|newest]
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