From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from mails.dpdk.org (mails.dpdk.org [217.70.189.124]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D4F78C61DBD for ; Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:29:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mails.dpdk.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mails.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E635140151; Fri, 28 Aug 2026 12:29:58 +0200 (CEST) Received: from inbox.dpdk.org (inbox.dpdk.org [95.142.172.178]) by mails.dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CEAFE40150 for ; Fri, 28 Aug 2026 12:29:57 +0200 (CEST) Received: by inbox.dpdk.org (Postfix, from userid 33) id C97464CF72; Fri, 28 Aug 2026 12:29:57 +0200 (CEST) From: bugzilla@dpdk.org To: dev@dpdk.org Subject: [DPDK/cryptodev Bug 1997] CN20K inline IPsec 3DES key overflow Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:29:57 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: AssignedTo X-Bugzilla-Type: new X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: DPDK X-Bugzilla-Component: cryptodev X-Bugzilla-Version: unspecified X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: thomas@monjalon.net X-Bugzilla-Status: UNCONFIRMED X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: Normal X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: dev@dpdk.org X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: bug_id short_desc product version rep_platform op_sys bug_status bug_severity priority component assigned_to reporter target_milestone bug_group Message-ID: Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Bugzilla-URL: https://bugs.dpdk.org/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated X-Auto-Response-Suppress: All MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dev-bounces@dpdk.org https://bugs.dpdk.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3D1997 Bug ID: 1997 Summary: CN20K inline IPsec 3DES key overflow Product: DPDK Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: UNCONFIRMED Severity: normal Priority: Normal Component: cryptodev Assignee: dev@dpdk.org Reporter: thomas@monjalon.net Target Milestone: --- Group: security Report date: 2026-03-11 Reported by: =E4=BE=AF=E6=9C=8B=E6=9C=8B Hello DPDK maintainers, I am reporting what looks like a real current-head intra-object overflow in= the `cn20k` inline-IPsec Ethernet security path. I rechecked current `main` (`8dc80afda7a52a1bd28088fe34102e7c1ba17282`) on 2026-03-10 before writing t= his mail. As on `cn10k`, the DPDK security core forwards the caller-provided configuration directly into the driver callback: ```c if (instance->ops->session_create(instance->device, conf, sess)) { rte_mempool_put(mp, (void *)sess); return NULL; } ``` For the `cn20k` inline path, current head then calls the `OW` SA fill helpe= rs directly: ```c rc =3D cnxk_ow_ipsec_outb_sa_fill(outb_sa_dptr, ipsec, crypto, 0); ... rc =3D cnxk_ow_ipsec_outb_sa_fill(outb_sa_dptr, ipsec, crypto, 0); ``` and again does not first call `cnxk_ipsec_xform_verify()`. In the shared `OW` helper, `3DES` is accepted by setting `enc_type`, but th= ere is no exact `=3D=3D 24` check before the key copy: ```c case RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC: w2->s.enc_type =3D ROC_IE_SA_ENC_3DES_CBC; break; ... key =3D cipher_xfrm->cipher.key.data; length =3D cipher_xfrm->cipher.key.length; ... if (key !=3D NULL && length !=3D 0) { memcpy(cipher_key, key, length); ... } ``` The same `cn20k` driver publishes exact `24` for `3DES` in its capability table: ```c .key_size =3D { .min =3D 24, .max =3D 24, .increment =3D 0 }, ``` But the runtime inline path still copies the full user-provided `length` in= to a fixed object field. The destination object is: ```c struct roc_ow_ipsec_outb_sa { ... uint8_t cipher_key[ROC_CTX_MAX_CKEY_LEN]; union roc_ow_ipsec_outb_iv iv; ... }; ``` with `ROC_CTX_MAX_CKEY_LEN =3D=3D 32`. So any `3DES` key longer than `32` bytes writes into the adjacent live `iv`. The cleanest concrete case is a `40`-byte `RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_3DES_CBC` key: - first `32` bytes fill `cipher_key` - next `8` bytes overwrite the beginning of `iv` - the helper returns `0` - `cn20k_eth_sec_session_create()` proceeds with SA installation Why I think this should be accepted as a real bug: - the path is current-head and reachable from the public session-create API - capability metadata is not a runtime guard in this path - the runtime code bypasses the verifier that would have enforced exact-len= gth constraints - the sink writes through a fixed in-object array into the next live member - the corrupted SA is still treated as successfully created The local proof results for the narrow `40`-byte case are: - `distance_cipher_key_to_iv=3D32` - `advertised_3des_key_max=3D24` - `provided_key_len=3D40` - `returned=3D0` - `overflow_bytes_into_iv=3D8` - `iv_prefix_hex=3D4242424242424242` - `guard_unchanged=3D1` Suggested fix: 1. Enforce exact `3DES` key length before `cnxk_ow_ipsec_*_sa_fill()` is ca= lled on the inline path. 2. Add a direct upper-bound guard before `memcpy(cipher_key, key, length)`. 3. Reuse the same xform-length verification logic across inline and non-inl= ine `cnxk` IPsec paths. --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are the assignee for the bug.=