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McKenney" , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <0d0e0a0a7136d49af9a8d6a849e1aa4bf086c472.1739790300.git.dvyukov@google.com> <81d94ec3-16af-45a7-87c6-ef76570953f8@intel.com> <6ada635e-973d-4e32-ab47-1fda12ee7ce7@efficios.com> <90a36a64-8ea5-4ea1-965f-bcec604c7d5b@intel.com> <6ad30642-c3b5-4ab8-9ed6-1fa8c56a8995@efficios.com> From: Dave Hansen Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzUVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT7CwXgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lczsFNBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABwsFfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y In-Reply-To: <6ad30642-c3b5-4ab8-9ed6-1fa8c56a8995@efficios.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On 2/21/25 12:05, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote: > On 2025-02-21 14:48, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 2/21/25 11:38, Mathieu Desnoyers wrote: >>> I agree that switching to permissive key in the fast path would be >>> simpler. AFAIU, the switch_to_permissive_pkey_reg() is only a pkey >>> read when the key is already permissive. >> >> Unfortunately, on x86, PKRU is almost never in its permissive state. We >> chose a policy (stored in the global init_pkru_value variable) that >> allows R/W access to pkey 0, but disables access to everything else. >> It's 0xfffffff5, IIRC. >> >> This ensures deny-by-default behavior and ensures that threads cloned >> off long ago don't have a dangerous PKRU value for newly-allocated and >> pkey-protected memory. >> >> If I had a time machine, it'd be interesting to go back and try to make >> PKRU's default value be all 0's and also represent the logically most >> restrictive value. > > Can we assume (or require) that struct rseq and struct rseq_cs reside in > pkey-0 memory ? Maybe. Signal stacks are _practically_ only able to use pkey-0. You can technically protect them with anything you want and then WRPKRU as the first instruction once you hop into the signal handler (since instruction fetches aren't affected by x86 pkeys), but I seriously doubt anybody would go to the trouble. > In that case, we could add something to the pkey API that switches to a > permissive state only if pkey 0 cannot be accessed. > > Therefore it would only trigger a pkey read in the common case, and > issue a pkey write only if pkey 0 is not accessible. I think that's a sane policy. An rseq access can happen at any time (from the app's perspective) so the access would theoretically be done with a random PKRU value from a random point in the thread's lifetime. But it is a different policy that we've chosen with signals and "remote" accesses, which is to just ignore pkeys entirely. I don't have a strong opinion. It's hard to balance performance and consistency with the other ABI here.