From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 14:13:43 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c7bd5e75-0f6f-6718-ce52-533bfad4f37e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241111134215.GBZzIJtw-T0mWVKG5l@fat_crate.local>
On 11/11/2024 7:12 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2024 at 05:14:43PM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> Memory allocated for the request, response and certs_data is not
>> freed and we will clear the mdesc when sev-guest driver calls
>> snp_msg_alloc().
>
> Ah, right.
>
> Yeah, this was a weird scheme anyway - a static pointer mdesc but then the
> things it points to get dynamically allocated. So yeah, a full dynamic
> allocation makes it a much more normal pattern.
I have pushed the updated tree here: https://github.com/AMDESE/linux-kvm/commits/sectsc-guest-wip/
Will wait for your comments on rest of the patches before I post the next version.
Regards
Nikunj
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-12 8:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-28 5:34 [PATCH v14 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 17:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30 4:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-30 10:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 8:41 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 8:46 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29 9:19 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 14:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-29 14:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 14:50 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 15:14 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-29 16:50 ` Dave Hansen
2024-10-29 17:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-30 11:55 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 7:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 8:46 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 11:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 11:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 13:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-12 8:43 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-11-11 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-01 16:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 7:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-11-11 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-11 16:39 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-11-11 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-29 3:02 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 3:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-29 9:15 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-29 9:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-28 5:34 ` [PATCH v14 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=c7bd5e75-0f6f-6718-ce52-533bfad4f37e@amd.com \
--to=nikunj@amd.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=pgonda@google.com \
--cc=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.