From: Bastien Nocera <hadess@hadess.net>
To: Elman Shahbazov <shahbazovelman97@gmail.com>,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Cc: secalert@redhat.com, Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix Out-of-Bounds Read in AVRCP GetFolderItems parsing
Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2026 11:46:26 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c80cfccc288532015fa968b9fe06f612b5dc365f.camel@hadess.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CADE-WFdQ+35ePBX35mQt6o61dyz7tBkKByVe1BnKzXxpb-njAw@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, 2026-08-02 at 08:06 +0400, Elman Shahbazov wrote:
> Hello BlueZ maintainers and Red Hat Security team,
>
> <snip>
> 4. Proof of Concept (PoC)
> I have attached poc_avrcp_obb.c which extracts the vulnerable logic
> and simulates
> the attack using a 14-byte malicious packet with an inflated namesize
> of 1000.
Do you have a proof of concept for the parse_media_folder() vuln?
I'm trying to integrate those into test cases.
>
> To verify the vulnerability:
> 1. Compile with AddressSanitizer:
> gcc -fsanitize=address -g -o poc_avrcp_oob poc_avrcp_obb.c
> 2. Run the binary:
> ./poc_avrcp_oob
>
> ASan will immediately detect the out-of-bounds access and abort:
> =================================================================
> ==113741==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
> 0x...
> READ of size 254 at 0x... thread T0
> #0 0x... in memcpy
> #1 0x... in parse_media_element_vuln
> #2 0x... in main
> SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow in
> parse_media_element_vuln
>
> [ 5. Proposed Fix
> The attached patch ensures that the length extracted from the packet
> is strictly
> validated against the remaining bytes in the packet buffer (len)
> before being
> used in memcpy. It also adds boundary checks before accessing
> subsequent offsets.
>
> Please review the attached .patch file. I am requesting a CVE
> assignment for
> this issue given its impact on system availability.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Elman Shahbazov
> Security Researcher
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 9:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-02 4:06 [PATCH] Fix Out-of-Bounds Read in AVRCP GetFolderItems parsing Elman Shahbazov
2026-08-02 6:20 ` bluez.test.bot
2026-08-04 9:46 ` Bastien Nocera [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-08-02 7:58 [PATCH] " Elman Shahbazov
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