From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/5] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 15:11:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1542841400.git.luto@kernel.org> (raw)
This series is a whole bunch of page fault cleanups, plus a couple
of OOPS diagnostic improvements. The overall goals are to clean up
handling of the faulting CPL, the USER bit in the error_code, and
the log messages generated by #PF OOPSes.
This series can also be seen as CET preparation. CET introduces the
WRUSS instruction, which is the very first way for CPL 0 code to
cause a #PF fault with the USER bit set. Let's get the page fault
code into shape before we start using WRUSS :)
Changes from v1:
- Rebase on top of tip:x86/mm, now that a bunch of v1 was applied.
The only material changes are that 'x86/fault: Check
user_mode(regs) when validating a stack extension' is gone
because the code it fixed has been deleted and that 'x86/fault:
Remove sw_error_code' lost the hunk that changed the same code.
Andy Lutomirski (5):
x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code
x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access
x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs()
x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better
x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
--
2.17.2
next reply other threads:[~2018-11-21 23:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-21 23:11 Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-21 23:11 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/fault: Remove sw_error_code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 10:09 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-21 23:11 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/fault: Don't try to recover from an implicit supervisor access Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 10:10 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-21 23:11 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/oops: Show the correct CS value in show_regs() Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 10:11 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-21 23:11 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 8:41 ` [PATCH 6/5] x86/fault: Clean up the page fault oops decoder a bit Ingo Molnar
2018-11-27 15:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-04 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 19:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-04 19:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-04 19:52 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-04 20:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-12-05 15:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2018-12-05 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 10:12 ` [tip:x86/mm] x86/fault: Decode page fault OOPSes better tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-21 23:11 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/vsyscall/64: Use X86_PF constants in the simulated #PF error code Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 10:11 ` [tip:x86/mm] " tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-22 9:52 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] x86/fault: #PF improvements, mostly related to USER bit Peter Zijlstra
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