From: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
To: <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>, <ast@kernel.org>,
<daniel@iogearbox.net>, <kernel-team@fb.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 bpf-next 0/7] bpf: Fix indirect var_off stack access support
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 23:22:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1554358433.git.rdna@fb.com> (raw)
v2->v3:
- sanity check max value for variable offset.
v1->v2:
- rely on meta = NULL to reject var_off stack access to uninit buffer.
This patch set is a follow-up for discussion [1].
It fixes variable offset stack access handling for raw and unprivileged
mode, rejecting both of them, and sanity checks max variable offset value.
Patch 1 handles raw (uninitialized) mode.
Patch 2 adds test for raw mode.
Patch 3 handles unprivileged mode.
Patch 4 adds test for unprivileged mode.
Patch 5 adds sanity check for max value of variable offset.
Patch 6 adds test for variable offset max value checking.
Patch 7 is a minor fix in verbose log.
Unprivileged mode is an interesting case since one (and only?) way to come
up with variable offset is to use pointer arithmetics. Though pointer
arithmetics is already prohibited for unprivileged mode. I'm not sure if
it's enough though and it seems like a good idea to still reject variable
offset for unpriv in check_stack_boundary(). Please see patches 3 and 4 for
more details on this.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=155419526427742&w=2
Andrey Ignatov (7):
bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in raw mode
selftests/bpf: Test indirect var_off stack access in raw mode
bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in unpriv mode
selftests/bpf: Test indirect var_off stack access in unpriv mode
bpf: Sanity check max value for var_off stack access
selftests/bpf: Test unbounded var_off stack access
bpf: Add missed newline in verifier verbose log
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 ++++++-
.../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/var_off.c | 111 +++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
next reply other threads:[~2019-04-04 6:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-04 6:22 Andrey Ignatov [this message]
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 1/7] bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in raw mode Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 2/7] selftests/bpf: Test " Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 3/7] bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in unpriv mode Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 4/7] selftests/bpf: Test " Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 5/7] bpf: Sanity check max value for var_off stack access Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 6/7] selftests/bpf: Test unbounded " Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-04 6:22 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 7/7] bpf: Add missed newline in verifier verbose log Andrey Ignatov
2019-04-05 15:03 ` [PATCH v3 bpf-next 0/7] bpf: Fix indirect var_off stack access support Daniel Borkmann
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