From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec()
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 14:55:19 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1729201904.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org> (raw)
At least for now, continue to assume mask_user_address() is safe on AMD
when combined with STAC/CLAC -- as get_user(), put_user() and
masked_user_access_begin() already do today.
v2:
- Separate copy_to_user() and clear_user() changes out into separate patches
- Add masking to __get_user() and __put_user()
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/b626840e55d4aa86b4b9b377a4cc2cda7038d33d.1728706156.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Josh Poimboeuf (6):
x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in copy_from_user()
x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in __get_user()
x86/uaccess: Rearrange putuser.S
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to __put_user()
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to copy_to_user()
x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to clear_user()
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 10 ++--
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 27 +++++++--
arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 92 ++++++++++++++++++------------
include/linux/uaccess.h | 6 --
5 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0
next reply other threads:[~2024-10-17 21:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-17 21:55 Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in copy_from_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() in __get_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/uaccess: Rearrange putuser.S Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-18 8:51 ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2024-10-18 15:55 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to __put_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to copy_to_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/uaccess: Add user pointer masking to clear_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-17 22:31 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] x86/uaccess: Avoid barrier_nospec() Andrew Cooper
2024-10-17 22:42 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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