From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>,
Frantisek Krenzelok <fkrenzel@redhat.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,
Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@amazon.com>,
Boris Pismenny <borisp@nvidia.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v4 0/6] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 16:50:47 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1731597571.git.sd@queasysnail.net> (raw)
This adds support for receiving KeyUpdate messages (RFC 8446, 4.6.3
[1]). A sender transmits a KeyUpdate message and then changes its TX
key. The receiver should react by updating its RX key before
processing the next message.
This patchset implements key updates by:
1. pausing decryption when a KeyUpdate message is received, to avoid
attempting to use the old key to decrypt a record encrypted with
the new key
2. returning -EKEYEXPIRED to syscalls that cannot receive the
KeyUpdate message, until the rekey has been performed by userspace
3. passing the KeyUpdate message to userspace as a control message
4. allowing updates of the crypto_info via the TLS_TX/TLS_RX
setsockopts
This API has been tested with gnutls to make sure that it allows
userspace libraries to implement key updates [2]. Thanks to Frantisek
Krenzelok <fkrenzel@redhat.com> for providing the implementation in
gnutls and testing the kernel patches.
=======================================================================
Discussions around v2 of this patchset focused on how HW offload would
interact with rekey.
RX
- The existing SW path will handle all records between the KeyUpdate
message signaling the change of key and the new key becoming known
to the kernel -- those will be queued encrypted, and decrypted in
SW as they are read by userspace (once the key is provided, ie same
as this patchset)
- Call ->tls_dev_del + ->tls_dev_add immediately during
setsockopt(TLS_RX)
TX
- After setsockopt(TLS_TX), switch to the existing SW path (not the
current device_fallback) until we're able to re-enable HW offload
- tls_device_sendmsg will call into tls_sw_sendmsg under lock_sock
to avoid changing socket ops during the rekey while another
thread might be waiting on the lock
- We only re-enable HW offload (call ->tls_dev_add to install the new
key in HW) once all records sent with the old key have been
ACKed. At this point, all unacked records are SW-encrypted with the
new key, and the old key is unused by both HW and retransmissions.
- If there are no unacked records when userspace does
setsockopt(TLS_TX), we can (try to) install the new key in HW
immediately.
- If yet another key has been provided via setsockopt(TLS_TX), we
don't install intermediate keys, only the latest.
- TCP notifies ktls of ACKs via the icsk_clean_acked callback. In
case of a rekey, tls_icsk_clean_acked will record when all data
sent with the most recent past key has been sent. The next call
to sendmsg will install the new key in HW.
- We close and push the current SW record before reenabling
offload.
If ->tls_dev_add fails to install the new key in HW, we stay in SW
mode. We can add a counter to keep track of this.
In addition:
Because we can't change socket ops during a rekey, we'll also have to
modify do_tls_setsockopt_conf to check ctx->tx_conf and only call
either tls_set_device_offload or tls_set_sw_offload. RX already uses
the same ops for both TLS_HW and TLS_SW, so we could switch between HW
and SW mode on rekey.
An alternative would be to have a common sendmsg which locks
the socket and then calls the correct implementation. We'll need that
anyway for the offload under rekey case, so that would only add a test
to the SW path's ops (compared to the current code). That should allow
us to simplify build_protos a bit, but might have a performance
impact - we'll need to check it if we want to go that route.
=======================================================================
Changes since v3:
- rebase on top of net-next
- rework tls_check_pending_rekey according to Jakub's feedback
- add statistics for rekey: {RX,TX}REKEY{OK,ERROR}
- some coding style clean ups
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1691584074.git.sd@queasysnail.net/ [v3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1676052788.git.sd@queasysnail.net/ [v2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/cover.1673952268.git.sd@queasysnail.net/ [v1]
Link: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446#section-4.6.3 [1]
Link: https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/merge_requests/1625 [2]
Sabrina Dubroca (6):
tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending
tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3
tls: add counters for rekey
docs: tls: document TLS1.3 key updates
selftests: tls: add key_generation argument to tls_crypto_info_init
selftests: tls: add rekey tests
Documentation/networking/tls.rst | 31 ++
include/net/tls.h | 3 +
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h | 4 +
net/tls/tls.h | 3 +-
net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +-
net/tls/tls_main.c | 71 ++++-
net/tls/tls_proc.c | 4 +
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 138 +++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 480 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
9 files changed, 676 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0
next reply other threads:[~2024-11-14 15:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-14 15:50 Sabrina Dubroca [this message]
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 1/6] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-04 3:47 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-10 16:16 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-10 23:33 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-05 12:30 ` Parthiban.Veerasooran
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 2/6] tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-04 3:58 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 3/6] tls: add counters for rekey Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-04 3:54 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-05 11:29 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 4/6] docs: tls: document TLS1.3 key updates Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-04 3:51 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-05 11:06 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-06 0:34 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 5/6] selftests: tls: add key_generation argument to tls_crypto_info_init Sabrina Dubroca
2024-11-14 15:50 ` [PATCH net-next v4 6/6] selftests: tls: add rekey tests Sabrina Dubroca
2024-11-19 3:41 ` [PATCH net-next v4 0/6] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Jakub Kicinski
2024-12-03 16:16 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-04 4:02 ` Jakub Kicinski
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