From: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 15:31:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d10e3bc5-5574-4498-9849-732fb373fa83@os.amperecomputing.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b9212134-0efa-422d-8cbf-4761e39ce8d6@arm.com>
On 8/27/25 9:09 AM, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 26/08/2025 21:18, Yang Shi wrote:
>>>>> from a contiguous cache of pages could help minimise the overhead, as
>>>>> proposed for x86 in [1].
>>>> I'm a little bit confused about how this can work. The contiguous
>>>> cache of pages should be some large page, for example, 2M. But the
>>>> page table pages allocated from the cache may have different
>>>> permissions if I understand correctly. The default permission is RO,
>>>> but some of them may become R/W at sometime, for example, when calling
>>>> set_pte_at(). You still need to split the linear mapping, right?
>>> When such a helper is called, *all* PTPs become writeable - there is no
>>> per-PTP permission switching.
>> OK, so all PTPs in the same contiguous cache will become writeable
>> even though the helper (i.e. set_pte_at()) is just called on one of
>> the PTPs. But doesn't it compromise the page table hardening somehow?
>> The PTPs from the same cache may belong to different processes.
> First just a note that this is true regardless of how the PTPs are
> allocated (i.e. this is already the case in this version of the series).
>
> Either way, yes you are right, this approach does not introduce any
> isolation *between* page tables - pgtable helpers are able to write to
> all page tables. In principle it should be possible to use a different
> pkey for kernel and user page tables, but that would make the kpkeys
> level switching in helpers quite a bit more complicated. Isolating
> further is impractical as we have so few pkeys (just 8 on arm64).
>
> That said, what kpkeys really tries to protect against is the direct
> corruption of critical data by arbitrary (unprivileged) code. If the
> attacker is able to manipulate calls to set_pte() and the likes, kpkeys
> cannot provide much protection - even if we restricted the writes to a
> specific set of page tables, the attacker would still be able to insert
> a translation to any arbitrary physical page.
I see. Thanks for elaborating this.
Yang
>
> - Kevin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-30 1:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-15 8:54 [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/18] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/18] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/18] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:54 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/18] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/18] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/18] arm64: Reset POR_EL1 on exception entry Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/18] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/18] mm: Introduce kernel_pgtables_set_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/18] mm: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-11-28 16:44 ` Yeoreum Yun
2025-12-01 9:19 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/18] mm: Allow __pagetable_ctor() to fail Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/18] mm: Map page tables with privileged pkey Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 16:37 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-18 16:02 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-18 17:01 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-19 9:35 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-10-01 15:28 ` David Hildenbrand
2025-10-01 17:22 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/18] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_LVL_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/18] arm64: mm: Guard page table writes with kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/18] arm64: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/18] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 8:55 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/18] arm64: mm: Batch kpkeys level switches Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-15 22:21 ` kernel test robot
2025-08-20 15:53 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/18] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:01 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-20 16:18 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-08-21 7:23 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-21 17:29 ` Yang Shi
2025-08-25 7:31 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-26 19:18 ` Yang Shi
2025-08-27 16:09 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-08-29 22:31 ` Yang Shi [this message]
2025-09-18 14:15 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 14:57 ` Will Deacon
2025-10-01 12:22 ` Kevin Brodsky
2025-09-18 17:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-10-01 12:41 ` Kevin Brodsky
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