From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Alistair Francis" <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
"Bob Eshleman" <bobbyeshleman@gmail.com>,
"Connor Davis" <connojdavis@gmail.com>,
"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/17] xen/riscv: implement p2m_next_level()
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2025 17:53:37 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d63ab4e1-d98b-4251-a5c7-87bf4688d5bb@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aabb6eeb-fe2a-4b95-b844-560d2c70bcd5@suse.com>
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On 7/16/25 1:43 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 16.07.2025 13:32, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>> On 7/2/25 10:35 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> On 10.06.2025 15:05, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c
>>>> @@ -387,6 +387,17 @@ static inline bool p2me_is_valid(struct p2m_domain *p2m, pte_t pte)
>>>> return p2m_type_radix_get(p2m, pte) != p2m_invalid;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +/*
>>>> + * pte_is_* helpers are checking the valid bit set in the
>>>> + * PTE but we have to check p2m_type instead (look at the comment above
>>>> + * p2me_is_valid())
>>>> + * Provide our own overlay to check the valid bit.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static inline bool p2me_is_mapping(struct p2m_domain *p2m, pte_t pte)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return p2me_is_valid(p2m, pte) && (pte.pte & PTE_ACCESS_MASK);
>>>> +}
>>> Same question as on the earlier patch - does P2M type apply to intermediate
>>> page tables at all? (Conceptually it shouldn't.)
>> It doesn't matter whether it is an intermediate page table or a leaf PTE pointing
>> to a page — PTE should be valid. Considering that in the current implementation
>> it’s possible for PTE.v = 0 but P2M.v = 1, it is better to check P2M.v instead
>> of PTE.v.
> I'm confused by this reply. If you want to name 2nd level page table entries
> P2M - fine (but unhelpful). But then for any memory access there's only one
> of the two involved: A PTE (Xen accesses) or a P2M (guest accesses). Hence
> how can there be "PTE.v = 0 but P2M.v = 1"?
I think I understand your confusion, let me try to rephrase.
The reason for having both|p2m_is_valid()| and|pte_is_valid()| is that I want to
have the ability to use the P2M PTE valid bit to track which pages were accessed
by a vCPU, so that cleaning and invalidating RAM associated with the guest vCPU
won't be too expensive, for example.
In this case, the P2M PTE valid bit will be set to 0, but the P2M PTE type bits
will be set to something other than|p2m_invalid| (even for a table entries),
so when an MMU fault occurs, we can properly resolve it.
So, if the P2M PTE type (what|p2m_is_valid()| checks) is set to|p2m_invalid|, it
means that the valid bit (what|pte_is_valid()| checks) should be set to 0, so
the P2M PTE is genuinely invalid.
It could also be the case that the P2M PTE type isn't|p2m_invalid (and P2M PTE valid will be intentionally set to 0 to have
ability to track which pages were accessed for the reason I wrote above)|, and when MMU fault occurs we could
properly handle it and set to 1 P2M PTE valid bit to 1...
>
> An intermediate page table entry is something Xen controls entirely. Hence
> it has no (guest induced) type.
... And actually it is a reason why it is needed to set a type even for an
intermediate page table entry.
I hope now it is a lit bit clearer what and why was done.
>
>>>> @@ -492,6 +503,70 @@ static pte_t p2m_entry_from_mfn(struct p2m_domain *p2m, mfn_t mfn, p2m_type_t t,
>>>> return e;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> +/* Generate table entry with correct attributes. */
>>>> +static pte_t page_to_p2m_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, struct page_info *page)
>>>> +{
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Since this function generates a table entry, according to "Encoding
>>>> + * of PTE R/W/X fields," the entry's r, w, and x fields must be set to 0
>>>> + * to point to the next level of the page table.
>>>> + * Therefore, to ensure that an entry is a page table entry,
>>>> + * `p2m_access_n2rwx` is passed to `mfn_to_p2m_entry()` as the access value,
>>>> + * which overrides whatever was passed as `p2m_type_t` and guarantees that
>>>> + * the entry is a page table entry by setting r = w = x = 0.
>>>> + */
>>>> + return p2m_entry_from_mfn(p2m, page_to_mfn(page), p2m_ram_rw, p2m_access_n2rwx);
>>> Similarly P2M access shouldn't apply to intermediate page tables. (Moot
>>> with that, but (ab)using p2m_access_n2rwx would also look wrong: You did
>>> read what it means, didn't you?)
>> |p2m_access_n2rwx| was chosen not really because of the description mentioned near
>> its declaration, but because it sets r=w=x=0, which RISC-V expects for a PTE that
>> points to the next-level page table.
>>
>> Generally, I agree that P2M access shouldn't be applied to intermediate page tables.
>>
>> What I can suggest in this case is to use|p2m_access_rwx| instead of|p2m_access_n2rwx|,
> No. p2m_access_* shouldn't come into play here at all.
Okay, then it seems like I just can't explicitly re-use p2m_pte_from_mfn() in
page_to_p2m_table() and have to open-code p2m_pte_from_mfn() or add another one
argument is_table to decide if p2m_access_t and/or p2m_type_t should be applied.
> Period. Just like P2M types
> shouldn't. As per above - intermediate page tables are Xen internal constructs.
Look please at the explaining above why p2m types is needed despite of the fact that
logically it isn't really needed.
>
>> which will ensure that the P2M access type isn't applied when|p2m_entry_from_mfn() |is called, and then, after calling|p2m_entry_from_mfn()|, simply set|PTE.r,w,x=0|.
>> So this function will look like:
>> /* Generate table entry with correct attributes. */
>> static pte_t page_to_p2m_table(struct p2m_domain *p2m, struct page_info *page)
>> {
>> /*
>> * p2m_ram_rw is chosen for a table entry as p2m table should be valid
>> * from both P2M and hardware point of view.
>> *
>> * p2m_access_rwx is chosen to restrict access permissions, what mean
>> * do not apply access permission for a table entry
>> */
>> pte_t pte = p2m_pte_from_mfn(p2m, page_to_mfn(page), _gfn(0), p2m_ram_rw,
>> p2m_access_rwx);
>>
>> /*
>> * Since this function generates a table entry, according to "Encoding
>> * of PTE R/W/X fields," the entry's r, w, and x fields must be set to 0
>> * to point to the next level of the page table.
>> */
>> pte.pte &= ~PTE_ACCESS_MASK;
>>
>> return pte;
>> }
>>
>> Does this make sense? Or would it be better to keep the current version of
>> |page_to_p2m_table()| and just improve the comment explaining why|p2m_access_n2rwx |is used for a table entry?
> No to both, as per above.
>
>>>> +static struct page_info *p2m_alloc_page(struct domain *d)
>>>> +{
>>>> + struct page_info *pg;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * For hardware domain, there should be no limit in the number of pages that
>>>> + * can be allocated, so that the kernel may take advantage of the extended
>>>> + * regions. Hence, allocate p2m pages for hardware domains from heap.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) )
>>>> + {
>>>> + pg = alloc_domheap_page(d, MEMF_no_owner);
>>>> + if ( pg == NULL )
>>>> + printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "Failed to allocate P2M pages for hwdom.\n");
>>>> + }
>>> The comment looks to have been taken verbatim from Arm. Whatever "extended
>>> regions" are, does the same concept even exist on RISC-V?
>> Initially, I missed that it’s used only for Arm. Since it was mentioned in
>> |doc/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc|, I assumed it applied to all architectures.
>> But now I see that it’s Arm-specific:: ### ext_regions (Arm)
>>
>>> Also, special casing Dom0 like this has benefits, but also comes with a
>>> pitfall: If the system's out of memory, allocations will fail. A pre-
>>> populated pool would avoid that (until exhausted, of course). If special-
>>> casing of Dom0 is needed, I wonder whether ...
>>>
>>>> + else
>>>> + {
>>>> + spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
>>>> + pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
>>>> + spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
>>>> + }
>>> ... going this path but with a Dom0-only fallback to general allocation
>>> wouldn't be the better route.
>> IIUC, then it should be something like:
>> static struct page_info *p2m_alloc_page(struct domain *d)
>> {
>> struct page_info *pg;
>>
>> spin_lock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
>> pg = page_list_remove_head(&d->arch.paging.p2m_freelist);
>> spin_unlock(&d->arch.paging.lock);
>>
>> if ( !pg && is_hardware_domain(d) )
>> {
>> /* Need to allocate more memory from domheap */
>> pg = alloc_domheap_page(d, MEMF_no_owner);
>> if ( pg == NULL )
>> {
>> printk(XENLOG_ERR "Failed to allocate pages.\n");
>> return pg;
>> }
>> ACCESS_ONCE(d->arch.paging.total_pages)++;
>> page_list_add_tail(pg, &d->arch.paging.freelist);
>> }
>>
>> return pg;
>> }
>>
>> And basically use|d->arch.paging.freelist| for both dom0less and dom0 domains,
>> with the only difference being that in the case of Dom0,|d->arch.paging.freelist |could be extended.
>>
>> Do I understand your idea correctly?
> Broadly yes, but not in the details. For example, I don't think such a
> page allocated from the general heap would want appending to freelist.
> Commentary and alike also would want tidying.
Could you please explain why it wouldn't want appending to freelist?
>
> And of course going forward, for split hardware and control domains the
> latter may want similar treatment.
Could you please clarify what is the difference between hardware and control
domains?
I thought that it is the same or is it for the case when we have
dom0 (control domain) which runs domD (hardware domain) and guest domain?
Thanks.
~ Oleksii
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-16 15:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 161+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-10 13:05 [PATCH v2 00/17] xen/riscv: introduce p2m functionality Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] xen/riscv: implement sbi_remote_hfence_gvma() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-18 15:15 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-23 14:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-23 14:39 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-23 14:45 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-24 10:33 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-24 10:48 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] xen/riscv: introduce sbi_remote_hfence_gvma_vmid() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-18 15:20 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-23 14:38 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] xen/riscv: introduce guest domain's VMID allocation and manegement Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-18 15:46 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-24 9:46 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-24 10:44 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-24 13:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-24 14:01 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-24 15:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 10:05 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 10:41 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-26 11:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 11:43 ` Juergen Gross
2025-06-26 12:05 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 12:17 ` Teddy Astie
2025-06-26 12:37 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-26 12:16 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-26 12:25 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] xen/riscv: construct the P2M pages pool for guests Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-18 15:53 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-25 14:48 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-25 14:55 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-01 13:04 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 10:30 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 10:34 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 11:17 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 11:48 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 11:56 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 12:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 12:49 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] xen/riscv: introduce things necessary for p2m initialization Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-18 16:08 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-25 15:31 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-25 15:53 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-26 8:40 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 11:01 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-26 11:55 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] xen/riscv: add root page table allocation Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 15:22 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-30 16:18 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 6:29 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-01 9:44 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 10:27 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-01 14:02 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 14:28 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 07/17] xen/riscv: introduce pte_{set,get}_mfn() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 14:57 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] xen/riscv: add new p2m types and helper macros for type classification Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-26 14:59 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-30 14:33 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 14:38 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 14:45 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-30 15:27 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 15:50 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 10:13 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 10:36 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-30 14:42 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-30 15:13 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 15:27 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] xen/riscv: introduce page_set_xenheap_gfn() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 15:48 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 15:59 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-03 5:59 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] xen/riscv: implement guest_physmap_add_entry() for mapping GFNs to MFNs Oleksii Kurochko
2025-06-30 15:59 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-03 11:02 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-03 11:33 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-03 11:54 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-03 13:09 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-03 13:28 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-03 13:34 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] xen/riscv: implement p2m_set_entry() and __p2m_set_entry() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 13:49 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-04 15:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-07 7:20 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-07 11:46 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-07 12:53 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-07 15:00 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-07 15:15 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-07 16:10 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-08 7:10 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-08 9:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-08 10:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-08 12:45 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-08 15:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-08 16:04 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-09 8:24 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-09 8:41 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] xen/riscv: Implement p2m_free_entry() and related helpers Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 14:23 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-11 15:56 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-14 7:15 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-14 16:01 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-14 16:17 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] xen/riscv: Implement p2m_entry_from_mfn() and support PBMT configuration Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-01 15:08 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-15 14:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-16 11:31 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-16 16:07 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-16 16:18 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-17 8:56 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-17 10:25 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-18 9:52 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 12:18 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 10:41 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-22 11:34 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-22 12:00 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 14:25 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-22 14:35 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 16:07 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-23 9:46 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-28 8:52 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-28 9:09 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-28 11:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-28 11:49 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 11:54 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] xen/riscv: implement p2m_next_level() Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 8:35 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-16 11:32 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-16 11:43 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-16 15:53 ` Oleksii Kurochko [this message]
2025-07-16 16:12 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-17 9:42 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-17 10:37 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-18 11:19 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 13:14 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] xen/riscv: Implement superpage splitting for p2m mappings Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 9:25 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-17 16:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 13:34 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 14:57 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-22 16:02 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-23 19:51 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-24 7:58 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] xen/riscv: implement mfn_valid() and page reference, ownership handling helpers Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 10:09 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 10:28 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-18 14:37 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 13:39 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 12:03 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-22 12:05 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-29 13:47 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-29 14:48 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-02 12:52 ` Orzel, Michal
2025-07-18 14:49 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 13:42 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-22 13:38 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 13:53 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-10 13:05 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] xen/riscv: add support of page lookup by GFN Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-02 11:44 ` Jan Beulich
2025-07-21 9:43 ` Oleksii Kurochko
2025-07-21 14:06 ` Jan Beulich
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