From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2020 09:45:39 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d7cec72d-cc3c-381b-38cd-20e7242bfda8@linux.intel.com> (raw)
Changes in v3:
- mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case
of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON
- reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n"
- updated security.txt content with new messages wording
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/66f2975b-4a69-b428-7dc5-d9aa40b3c673@linux.intel.com/
Changes in v2:
- implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN
with CAP_PERFMON capability;
- introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use
perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open()
syscall;
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b8a0669e-36e4-a0e8-fd35-3dbd890d2170@linux.intel.com/
repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core
sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c
Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify
in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced
SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps
how the changes look like and how to test the patch set.
---
Alexey Budankov (3):
perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed
perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues
tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt | 2 +-
tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
tools/perf/util/cloexec.c | 4 +-
tools/perf/util/evsel.c | 39 ++--
4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
--
2.24.1
next reply other threads:[~2020-04-24 6:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-24 6:45 Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-04-24 6:49 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed Alexey Budankov
2020-04-24 6:50 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-04-24 6:51 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues Alexey Budankov
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-04-30 7:06 [PATCH v3 0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control Alexey Budankov
2020-05-18 8:07 ` Alexey Budankov
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