From: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>,
"Stephen Hemminger" <sthemmin@microsoft.com>,
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>,
Dirk Hohndel <dirkhh@vmware.com>,
Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>,
Tony W Wang-oc <TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>,
"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Gordon Tetlow <gordon@tetlows.org>,
David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Subject: RE: TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware)
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2020 17:35:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <dfce335fefe043868301bacf57120759@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWy2x-RByfknjjKxRbE0LBPk2Ugj1d58xYHb91ogbfnvA@mail.gmail.com>
> > Or malicious hypervisor action, and that's a problem.
> >
> > Suppose the hypervisor remaps a GPA used in the SYSCALL gap (e.g. the
> > actual SYSCALL text or the first memory it accesses -- I don't have a
> > TDX spec so I don't know the details).
Is it feasible to defend against a malicious (or buggy) hypervisor?
Obviously, we can't leave holes that guests can exploit. But the hypervisor
can crash the system no matter how clever TDX is.
-Tony
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-25 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-24 12:24 [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware Thomas Gleixner
2020-08-24 13:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-25 4:39 ` TDX #VE in SYSCALL gap (was: [RFD] x86: Curing the exception and syscall trainwreck in hardware) Sean Christopherson
2020-08-25 15:25 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-25 16:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 17:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-25 17:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 17:35 ` Luck, Tony [this message]
2020-08-25 17:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-25 17:59 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-25 18:38 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-25 19:49 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-08-26 19:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-30 15:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-30 18:37 ` Linus Torvalds
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=dfce335fefe043868301bacf57120759@intel.com \
--to=tony.luck@intel.com \
--cc=David.Kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=TonyWWang-oc@zhaoxin.com \
--cc=alexander.levin@microsoft.com \
--cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
--cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
--cc=dirkhh@vmware.com \
--cc=gordon@tetlows.org \
--cc=hpa@linux.intel.com \
--cc=jan.kiszka@siemens.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=puwen@hygon.cn \
--cc=sean.j.christopherson@intel.com \
--cc=sthemmin@microsoft.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.