From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from mx3-rdu2.redhat.com ([66.187.233.73] helo=mx1.redhat.com) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1fBXlM-0004R7-Jh for speck@linutronix.de; Thu, 26 Apr 2018 05:40:05 +0200 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2847B818533A for ; Thu, 26 Apr 2018 03:39:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: from washington.bos.jonmasters.org (ovpn-126-71.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.126.71]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E52D76F9E8 for ; Thu, 26 Apr 2018 03:39:57 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH 1/6] Patch 1 References: <20180425173619.GJ14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20180425181152.GK14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20180425185140.GL14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20180425211901.GN14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20180425231238.GO14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20180425233945.GQ14273@tassilo.jf.intel.com> From: Jon Masters Message-ID: Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 23:39:57 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="IWsHhqTQAr8QeE3sTq4Uxqn2eF9hWQiwB"; protected-headers="v1" To: speck@linutronix.de List-ID: This is an OpenPGP/MIME encrypted message (RFC 4880 and 3156) --IWsHhqTQAr8QeE3sTq4Uxqn2eF9hWQiwB Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 04/25/2018 11:22 PM, speck for Linus Torvalds wrote: > I don't know. Maybe I'm missing something. But it *already* sounds=20 > impossible to use in practice, and I pretty much guarantee that if you= =20 > need terabytes of swap space in use on a desktop (and another 6-8 bits = of=20 > physical addressing on the Xeons?) there is absolutely no way people wi= ll=20 > have swap offsets big enough to ever hit the MAX_PA/2 bit. A bunch of us (including Amazon) discussed this limitation (MAX_PA/2) and it seemed somewhat academic that you'd be able to pull off an attack at that point reliably. There doesn't seem to be any downside to adding a vulnerable warning in sysfs in that case, which was also suggested. Jon. --=20 Computer Architect | Sent from my Fedora powered laptop --IWsHhqTQAr8QeE3sTq4Uxqn2eF9hWQiwB--