All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yonghong Song <yhs@meta.com>
To: Ze Gao <zegao2021@gmail.com>, Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Ze Gao <zegao@tencent.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: reject blacklisted symbols in kprobe_multi to avoid recursive trap
Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 07:29:02 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ee28e791-b3ab-3dfd-161b-4e7ec055c6ff@meta.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD8CoPC_=d+Aocp8pnSi9cbU6HWBNc697bKUS1UydtB-4DFzrA@mail.gmail.com>



On 5/11/23 10:53 PM, Ze Gao wrote:
> Yes, Jiri. Thanks for pointing it out. It's true that not all probe
> blacklisted functions should be banned from bpf_kprobe.
> 
> I tried some of them, and all kprobe blacklisted symbols I hooked
> works fine except preempt_count_{sub, add}.
> so the takeaway here is preempt_cout_{sub, add} must be rejected at
> least for now since kprobe_multi_link_prog_run
> ( i.e., the fprobe handler) and rethook_trampoline_handler( i.e. the
> rethook handler) calls preempt_cout_{sub, add}.
> 
> I'm considering providing a general  fprobe_blacklist framework just
> like what kprobe does to allow others to mark
> functions used inside fprobe handler or rethook handler as NOFPROBE to
> avoid potential stack recursion. But only after
> I figure out how ftrace handles recursion problems currently and why
> it fails in the case I ran into.

A fprobe_blacklist might make sense indeed as fprobe and kprobe are 
quite different... Thanks for working on this.

> 
> Thanks
> Ze
> 
> On Thu, May 11, 2023 at 1:28 AM Jiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, May 10, 2023 at 07:13:58AM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/10/23 5:20 AM, Ze Gao wrote:
>>>> BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI attaches kprobe programs through fprobe,
>>>> however it does not takes those kprobe blacklisted into consideration,
>>>> which likely introduce recursive traps and blows up stacks.
>>>>
>>>> this patch adds simple check and remove those are in kprobe_blacklist
>>>> from one fprobe during bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach. And also
>>>> check_kprobe_address_safe is open for more future checks.
>>>>
>>>> note that ftrace provides recursion detection mechanism, but for kprobe
>>>> only, we can directly reject those cases early without turning to ftrace.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Ze Gao <zegao@tencent.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>    kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>    1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>>> index 9a050e36dc6c..44c68bc06bbd 100644
>>>> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>>> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
>>>> @@ -2764,6 +2764,37 @@ static int get_modules_for_addrs(struct module ***mods, unsigned long *addrs, u3
>>>>      return arr.mods_cnt;
>>>>    }
>>>> +static inline int check_kprobe_address_safe(unsigned long addr)
>>>> +{
>>>> +   if (within_kprobe_blacklist(addr))
>>>> +           return -EINVAL;
>>>> +   else
>>>> +           return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(unsigned long *addrs, int num)
>>>> +{
>>>> +   int i, cnt;
>>>> +   char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
>>>> +
>>>> +   for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
>>>> +           if (check_kprobe_address_safe((unsigned long)addrs[i])) {
>>>> +                   lookup_symbol_name(addrs[i], symname);
>>>> +                   pr_warn("bpf_kprobe: %s at %lx is blacklisted\n", symname, addrs[i]);
>>>
>>> So user request cannot be fulfilled and a warning is issued and some
>>> of user requests are discarded and the rest is proceeded. Does not
>>> sound a good idea.
>>>
>>> Maybe we should do filtering in user space, e.g., in libbpf, check
>>> /sys/kernel/debug/kprobes/blacklist and return error
>>> earlier? bpftrace/libbpf-tools/bcc-tools all do filtering before
>>> requesting kprobe in the kernel.
>>
>> also fprobe uses ftrace drectly without paths in kprobe, so I wonder
>> some of the kprobe blacklisted functions are actually safe
>>
>> jirka
>>
>>>
>>>> +                   /* mark blacklisted symbol for remove */
>>>> +                   addrs[i] = 0;
>>>> +           }
>>>> +   }
>>>> +
>>>> +   /* remove blacklisted symbol from addrs */
>>>> +   for (i = 0, cnt = 0; i < num; ++i) {
>>>> +           if (addrs[i])
>>>> +                   addrs[cnt++]  = addrs[i];
>>>> +   }
>>>> +
>>>> +   return cnt;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>>    int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>>>    {
>>>>      struct bpf_kprobe_multi_link *link = NULL;
>>>> @@ -2859,6 +2890,12 @@ int bpf_kprobe_multi_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *pr
>>>>      else
>>>>              link->fp.entry_handler = kprobe_multi_link_handler;
>>>> +   cnt = check_bpf_kprobe_addrs_safe(addrs, cnt);
>>>> +   if (!cnt) {
>>>> +           err = -EINVAL;
>>>> +           goto error;
>>>> +   }
>>>> +
>>>>      link->addrs = addrs;
>>>>      link->cookies = cookies;
>>>>      link->cnt = cnt;

  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-12 14:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-10 12:20 [PATCH] bpf: reject blacklisted symbols in kprobe_multi to avoid recursive trap Ze Gao
2023-05-10 14:13 ` Yonghong Song
2023-05-10 17:27   ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-10 20:20     ` Yonghong Song
2023-05-10 23:54       ` Yonghong Song
2023-05-11  1:24         ` Ze Gao
2023-05-11  2:06           ` Ze Gao
2023-05-16  4:57           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2023-05-12  5:53     ` Ze Gao
2023-05-12 14:29       ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2023-05-12 22:33         ` Jiri Olsa
2023-05-13  4:17         ` Steven Rostedt
2023-05-13  9:19           ` Ze Gao
2023-05-14 17:11           ` Yonghong Song
2023-05-16  4:31           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2023-05-16  5:10             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2023-05-16  5:49         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2023-05-16 15:16           ` Yonghong Song
2023-05-11  1:06   ` Ze Gao
2023-05-15  5:59     ` Ze Gao

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ee28e791-b3ab-3dfd-161b-4e7ec055c6ff@meta.com \
    --to=yhs@meta.com \
    --cc=andrii@kernel.org \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=haoluo@google.com \
    --cc=john.fastabend@gmail.com \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
    --cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
    --cc=olsajiri@gmail.com \
    --cc=rostedt@goodmis.org \
    --cc=sdf@google.com \
    --cc=song@kernel.org \
    --cc=yhs@fb.com \
    --cc=zegao2021@gmail.com \
    --cc=zegao@tencent.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.