From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"khaliidcaliy@gmail.com" <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64()
Date: Mon, 23 Jun 2025 11:26:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f81447e67af13eb211ddb97511657931cd95f2f4.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250619073652.719-1-khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>
On Thu, 2025-06-19 at 07:36 +0000, Khalid Ali wrote:
> Avoid returning the SME encryption mask from __startup_64(), and instead
> let the function handle encryption directly as needed.
>
Some nits below:
"the function" here is confusing, since it sounds like you are referring to
__startup_64(), but I think you actually meant its caller.
So, "the function" -> "the caller".
> The encryption
> mask is already available to callers and can be accessed via
"callers" -> "users", since only functions can have callers?
Or just:
The encryption mask is already available after sme_enable() and ...
?
> sme_get_me_mask() in C code, or directly through the sme_me_mask symbol
> in assembly, if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is enabled.
>
> This change aligns with how secondary_startup_64_no_verify handles SME
> and keeps the behavior consistent. For Intel CPUs, SME is not relevant,
> so there is no need to retrieve the mask unless CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Khalid Ali <khaliidcaliy@gmail.com>
Overall I think this patch makes code logic clearer, so:
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-23 11:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-19 7:36 [PATCH v4] x86/boot: Don't return encryption mask from __startup_64() Khalid Ali
2025-06-23 11:26 ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2025-06-25 6:40 ` kernel test robot
2025-06-25 10:55 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 12:34 ` Khalid Ali
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=f81447e67af13eb211ddb97511657931cd95f2f4.camel@intel.com \
--to=kai.huang@intel.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=khaliidcaliy@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.