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Miller" , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Johannes Berg , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , Bjorn Helgaas , "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" , Suravee Suthikulpanit , Vasant Hegde , Will Deacon , David Woodhouse , Lu Baolu , Johan Hovold , Eric Dumazet , Marcel Holtmann , Luiz Augusto von Dentz , Nipun Gupta , Nikhil Agarwal , Pieter Jansen van Vuuren , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev, linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe References: <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-0-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> <20261109-device-trust-core-v2-18-3b12d9a9f861@nvidia.com> <20261110122237.GG8635@unreal> <20261117124801.GD124972@unreal> From: Alexey Kardashevskiy Content-Language: en-US In-Reply-To: <20261117124801.GD124972@unreal> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; 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>>>>> + struct device *restricted = NULL; >>>>> struct group_device *gdev; >>>>> int driver_type = 0; >>>>> @@ -1901,14 +1901,15 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group, >>>>> driver_type = iommu_get_def_domain_type(group, gdev->dev, >>>>> driver_type); >>>>> - if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && to_pci_dev(gdev->dev)->untrusted) { >>>>> + if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && >>>>> + pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(gdev->dev))) { >>>> >>>> I think this should be the generic device_is_adversarial(gdev->dev) now - in >>>> fact probably all the dev_is_pci()/to_pci_dev() stanzas aren't conceptually >>>> PCI-specific, just an artefact of the current "untrusted" flag being so. >>> >>> I wanted to do the same, but iommu_get_default_domain_type() may be called >>> before the PCI device's trust level has been set. At that point, we are >>> still in "disabled" mode, whereas device_is_adversarial() checks for >>> "adversarial" mode. >>> >>> The below is from AI, I asked to present me the path for that: >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> For a newly discovered PCI device with an available IOMMU and a new IOMMU group: >>> pci_scan_single_device() >>> pci_device_add() >>> device_add() >>> bus_notify(dev, BUS_NOTIFY_ADD_DEVICE) >>> blocking_notifier_call_chain() >>> notifier_call_chain() >>> iommu_bus_notifier() >>> iommu_probe_device(dev) >>> __iommu_probe_device(dev, NULL) >>> iommu_setup_default_domain(group, 0) >>> iommu_get_default_domain_type(group, 0) >>> >>> For a device whose initial policy is adversary, its state during that call is: >>> dev->trust_policy = DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY >>> dev->trust_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED >>> dev->trust_committed_level = DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED >>> dev->driver = NULL >>> >>> device_is_adversarial(dev) = false >>> >>> The active level changes later, during binding: >>> really_probe() >>> device_trust_prepare() >>> __device_trust_prepare() >>> WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_level, DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY) >>> dev->bus->dma_configure() >>> call_driver_probe() >> >> OK, that seems less than ideal. Feels like it would be better if bus code >> set the initial device state prior to device_add, so then it only ever >> changes later as a result of an explicit attestation/acceptance process. If >> the initial IOMMU probe still has to poke into bus-specific code to avoid >> always making a worst-case assumption, doesn't that rather defeat the point >> of having a generic abstraction? > > As Jason said, this is part of a very large series. Each series is an > adventure in itself. Even Greg's seemingly simple request to convert the > USB authorization knob to this new scheme has been extremely painful > because of AI reviews. They keep pointing out bugs and gaps that are > automatically attributed to me simply because I'm touching that part of > the code. > >> >> Even with the slightly dubious argument that this series only intends to >> shuffle the existing PCI code around rather than fully introduce the generic >> abstraction that it claims to, if the PCI behaviour is still just based on >> propagating the internal "untrusted" flag plus the new global override, both >> of which *are* known at add_device time into the common trust state, then >> there seems little excuse for not doing that up-front so that the new API >> *can* just work as expected. > > I would prefer to keep both PCI and USB out of this series on device trust > levels. Let's see what people say if I drop them in v3. I'd rather you did not as it is going to make experiments with CoCo VMs harder. > >> >>>> >>>>> /* >>>>> - * No ARM32 using systems will set untrusted, it cannot >>>>> - * work. >>>>> + * No ARM32 using systems select a restricted trust >>>>> + * policy; it cannot work. >>>>> */ >>>>> if (WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_DMA_USE_IOMMU))) >>>>> return -1; >>>>> - untrusted = gdev->dev; >>>>> + restricted = gdev->dev; >>>>> } >>>>> } >>>> [...] >>>>> @@ -616,6 +608,28 @@ static inline struct pci_dev *to_pci_dev(const struct device *dev) >>>>> { >>>>> return container_of(dev, struct pci_dev, dev); >>>>> } >>>>> + >>>>> +static inline bool >>>>> +pci_dev_default_is_restricted(const struct pci_dev *pdev) >>>>> +{ >>>>> + enum device_trust_policy policy = READ_ONCE(pdev->dev.trust_policy); >>>>> + >>>>> + return policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED || >>>>> + policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY; >>>>> +} >>>> >>>> Unless I've wildly misunderstood, I'm not sure this is right - if the user >>>> has set DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED to explicitly override the bus-default >>>> behaviour, but that leads to the IOMMU layer special-casing all PCI devices >>>> as adversarial and thus force-*enabling* all their trust-model restrictions, >>>> isn't that pretty much the complete opposite of what was asked for? >>> >>> We have two levels: policy - that describes the default of all devices >>> for that bus. level - actual decision on how that device is going to be >>> operated. >>> >>> "Disabled" prevents driver probing until the device is authorized, >>> "Adversary" permits probing and requests the available protections >>> for operating an untrusted device. >>> >>> Both need conservative initial IOMMU setup: a disabled device may later >>> be authorized as adversary, and authorization does not rebuild its IOMMU >>> domain. >> >> Urgh, I can be absolutely certain I'm not the only one who is going to be >> confused this way... I see "disabled" and instinctively take it to mean >> disabling the device_trust *mechanism*, as the logical thing that people >> will reach for in terms of "I don't care what this new thing is, just get it >> out of my way and let my drivers work like they always used to; I want to >> disable the new thing." > > I completely agree. I was under the impression that these names had already > been decided, since I picked up where Dan left off.>> >> From there it then also makes perfect self-consistent sense that >> "device_trust=full" would be the opposite end of the scale as in "Apply the >> explicit trust model 'fully', to all devices regardless of their bus-level >> default." >> >> Now I guess you could name it something like "device.default_trust_level" to >> attempt to make it clearer that it represents a value the value represents >> the "trust" *of* each individual device itself, but TBH it's still liable to >> look backwards to many users - similarly it's hard to guess that >> FOO_POLICY_DISABLED might mean something entirely different from "don't >> enforce the policy for FOO.", thus rather than try to contort the naming of >> everything, I'd still be much more inclined to just flip the meanings to be >> more intuitive from the outsider perspective. >> >> Say you upgrade your kernel and find your boot is broken because it now >> flibbles, but at least there is a "flibble" parameter whose values are >> "disabled", "wibble" and "frobble". Are you really going to spend time >> straight off reading up on what flibbling is to understand what wibbles and >> frobbles mean? Or is your instinct just going to be to try the seemingly >> obvious way of disabling flibbling, and then getting positively annoyed if >> that only makes it flibble harder? > > What about: blocked, adversarial and unrestricted yes, that's better. > instead of: disabled, adversarial and full may be simplify: blocked, restricted, unrestricted? Thanks, > > Thanks > >> >> Robin. -- Alexey