From: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com,
kernellwp@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] Add support for EPT execute only for nested hypervisors
Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2016 11:47:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <jpgtwft7d6d.fsf@linux.bootlegged.copy> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <921eef54-f23b-cd90-8e20-a428a00a3297@redhat.com> (Paolo Bonzini's message of "Wed, 13 Jul 2016 17:27:05 +0200")
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> writes:
> On 13/07/2016 17:06, Bandan Das wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
>>> index 190c0559c221..bd2535fdb9eb 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
>>> @@ -2524,11 +2524,10 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
>>> return 0;
>>>
>>> /*
>>> - * In the non-EPT case, execonly is not valid and so
>>> - * the following line is equivalent to spte |= PT_PRESENT_MASK.
>>> * For the EPT case, shadow_present_mask is 0 if hardware
>>> - * supports it and we honor whatever way the guest set it.
>>> - * See: FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h
>>> + * supports exec-only page table entries. In that case,
>>> + * ACC_USER_MASK and shadow_user_mask are used to represent
>>> + * read access. See FNAME(gpte_access) in paging_tmpl.h.
>>> */
>>
>> I would still prefer a note about the non-EPT case, makes it easy to
>> understand.
>
> I can add "shadow_present_mask is PT_PRESENT_MASK in the non-EPT case"
> but it's a bit of a tautology.
shadow_present_mask actually signifies different things for ept/non-ept
cases and it doesn't hurt to mention it. But I get your point, maybe,
it's self-explanatory.
>>> spte |= shadow_present_mask;
>>> if (!speculative)
>>> @@ -3923,9 +3922,6 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>> * clearer.
>>> */
>>> smap = cr4_smap && u && !uf && !ff;
>>> - } else {
>>> - if (shadow_present_mask)
>>> - u = 1;
>>> }
>>>
>>> fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) ||
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> index 576c47cda1a3..dfef081e76c0 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
>>> @@ -6120,12 +6120,14 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>> gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
>>> trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
>>>
>>> - /* It is a write fault? */
>>> + /* it is a read fault? */
>>> + error_code = (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_USER_MASK;
>>> + /* it is a write fault? */
>>> error_code = exit_qualification & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
>>> /* It is a fetch fault? */
>>> error_code |= (exit_qualification << 2) & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
>>> /* ept page table is present? */
>>> - error_code |= (exit_qualification >> 3) & PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
>>> + error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x38) != 0;
>>>
>>
>> Thank you for the thorough review here. I missed that we didn't set the read bit
>> at all. I am still a little unclear how permission_fault works though...
>>
>>> vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
>>>
>>> @@ -6474,8 +6476,7 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
>>> (enable_ept_ad_bits) ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
>>> 0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK,
>>> cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only() ?
>>> - 0ull : PT_PRESENT_MASK);
>>> - BUILD_BUG_ON(PT_PRESENT_MASK != VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK);
>>> + 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK);
>>
>> I wanted to keep it the former way because "PT_PRESENT_MASK is equal to VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK"
>> is an assumption all throughout. I wanted to use this section to catch mismatches.
>
> I think there's no such assumption anymore, actually. Can you double
> check? If there are any, that's where the BUILD_BUG_ON should be.
What I meant is how they are the same bit. is_shadow_present_pte() is probably one
and another one is link_shadow_page() which already has a BUILD_BUG_ON().
> Paolo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-13 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-12 22:18 [PATCH v2 0/5] Add support for EPT execute only for nested hypervisors Bandan Das
2016-07-12 22:18 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] mmu: extend the is_present check to 32 bits Bandan Das
2016-09-01 14:20 ` Li, Liang Z
2016-09-01 15:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-12 22:18 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] mmu: don't set the present bit unconditionally Bandan Das
2016-07-13 8:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-12 22:18 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] mmu: remove is_present_gpte() Bandan Das
2016-07-12 22:18 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] mmu: change unconditional setting of the u bit in fault bitmap Bandan Das
2016-07-13 8:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-13 9:06 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-12 22:18 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] vmx: advertise support for ept execute only Bandan Das
2016-07-13 9:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] Add support for EPT execute only for nested hypervisors Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-13 9:49 ` Fam Zheng
2016-07-13 10:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-13 15:06 ` Bandan Das
2016-07-13 15:27 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-13 15:47 ` Bandan Das [this message]
2016-07-14 6:56 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-14 17:38 ` Bandan Das
2016-07-14 18:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-07-14 18:52 ` Bandan Das
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=jpgtwft7d6d.fsf@linux.bootlegged.copy \
--to=bsd@redhat.com \
--cc=guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kernellwp@gmail.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.