From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753746Ab1JHVGn (ORCPT ); Sat, 8 Oct 2011 17:06:43 -0400 Received: from inx.pm.waw.pl ([195.116.170.130]:45265 "EHLO inx.pm.waw.pl" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751380Ab1JHVGm (ORCPT ); Sat, 8 Oct 2011 17:06:42 -0400 From: Krzysztof Halasa To: Jon Masters Cc: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu, Adrian Bunk , "Frank Ch. Eigler" , "H. Peter Anvin" , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Greg KH Subject: Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust References: <4E8655CD.90107@zytor.com> <201110020304.28288.rjw@sisk.pl> <4E87B885.50005@zytor.com> <201110021354.57995.rjw@sisk.pl> <4E88A537.4010008@zytor.com> <20111003093239.GB25136@localhost.pp.htv.fi> <20111003180441.GD3072@localhost.pp.htv.fi> <34045.1317760188@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <1317916702.19519.1.camel@constitution.bos.jonmasters.org> <14191.1317930659@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <15324.1318004954@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <1318050133.19519.184.camel@constitution.bos.jonmasters.org> <58779.1318084612@turing-police.cc.vt.edu> <1318096788.19519.187.camel@constitution.bos.jonmasters.org> Date: Sat, 08 Oct 2011 23:06:39 +0200 In-Reply-To: <1318096788.19519.187.camel@constitution.bos.jonmasters.org> (Jon Masters's message of "Sat, 08 Oct 2011 13:59:48 -0400") Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Jon Masters writes: > One reason I stopped doing keysigning parties is that I > realized they were mostly a show. You turn up and get a key signed and > then everyone is impressed that you're in the strong set...wupdedoo. I think there are other weaknesses than those. Examples: - people checking the fingerprints on the keyserver, then getting the keys later and signing without checking the fingerprints again (the fingerprint may "change"), - people sending the public key through email etc., and signing the key without checking (the key may change in email). Especially in a situation like this one, when a key signing activity is expected, people MUST check the fingerprint against the authenticated one WHILE signing the key. It's probably more important that the very careful check of ID authenticity (watermarks etc). I'd be only a little surprised if some key signing fraud resulting in kernel.org access attempt or something similar is detected soon. > Not > that I've anything against signing stuff on kernel.org and trying to > improve things (I've long directly signed everything on master with my > own keys in slight violation of policy, but that turned out to right). At first I thought you meant signing with your private key on master :-) -- Krzysztof Halasa