Re: Fedora Core 2 setools RPM

[guttman@mitre.org (Joshua D. Guttman)]

Steve --

So in some sense the bottom line is that you think the type relations
give the essential core of the policy info, and to a first
approximation one can focus on that.

Of course, it's still desirable to have access to the supplementary
information (and an idea how to interpret it) so that the further
refinement will eventually work out.  

A different point is that the main value added of slat is much more
expressive security goals (even when restricted to the types info).
You're not just talking about accessibility of a type to information
flow from another, but also whether all the possible flows go through
a desired gate type.  And the key fact you mentioned at the end of
your last message

Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> writes:

>   But from an information flow perspective, you simply want to prove
>   that user_t can only reach sysadm_t through specific gate domains
>   like newrole_t.

is of this form:  It's apparently not expressible as a simple
information flow accessibility assertion.

Cheers --

        Joshua 



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	Joshua D. Guttman		<guttman@mitre.org>
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