From: Robert Nichols <rnicholsNOSPAM@comcast.net>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt from apparently healthy SSD
Date: Sat, 22 Apr 2017 08:33:28 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <odfm32$fpm$1@blaine.gmane.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170422002548.GA23882@tansi.org>
On 04/21/2017 07:25 PM, Arno Wagner wrote:
> Aassume 1 bit has been corrupted in a random place.
> A key-slot is 256kB, i.e. 2Mbit. That means trying it
> out (flip one bit, do an unlock attempt) would take
> 2 million seconds on the original PC, i.e. 23 days.
> This can maybe be brought down by a factor of 5 or so
> with the fastest avaliable CPU (the oteration count of
> 150k is pretty low), i.e. still roughly 5 days.
>
> This may be worth giving it a try, but it requires some
> serious coding with libcryptsetup and it will only
> help on a single bit-error.
>
> It may of course be a more complex error, especially
> when ECC in the disk has corrected an error to the
> wrong value, because the original was too corrupted.
The drive would almost certainly have detected and corrected a single-bit error.
>
> The keyslot checker is no help here, it is intendend
> to find gross localized corruption,
It is still worth running the keyslot checker to detect gross corruption before spending 5+ days in a (probably futile) search for a single bit flip.
--
Bob Nichols "NOSPAM" is really part of my email address.
Do NOT delete it.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-22 13:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <a6e54426-5188-d4c7-ee7b-6f022b84bf22@depressiverobots.com>
2017-04-21 14:26 ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt from apparently healthy SSD protagonist
2017-04-21 23:25 ` David Christensen
2017-04-22 0:25 ` Arno Wagner
2017-04-22 13:33 ` Robert Nichols [this message]
2017-04-22 13:45 ` Arno Wagner
2017-04-22 18:02 ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of bit errors protagonist
2017-04-23 20:03 ` [dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot " protagonist
2017-04-24 5:50 ` Dominic Raferd
2017-04-24 13:26 ` protagonist
2017-04-24 17:00 ` Dominic Raferd
2017-04-24 17:44 ` Michael Kjörling
2017-04-24 23:49 ` protagonist
2017-04-25 13:14 ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 13:44 ` Dominic Raferd
2017-04-25 14:37 ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 14:43 ` Robert Nichols
2017-04-25 14:45 ` Ondrej Kozina
2017-04-25 16:16 ` Sven Eschenberg
2017-04-25 16:30 ` Milan Broz
2017-04-25 17:09 ` Sven Eschenberg
2017-04-26 14:45 ` Hendrik Brueckner
2017-04-26 18:46 ` Milan Broz
2017-04-28 15:51 ` protagonist
2017-04-30 15:06 ` protagonist
2017-04-30 18:39 ` Arno Wagner
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