From: ramsdell@mitre.org (John D. Ramsdell)
To: SELinux List <SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: Announcement: setools version 1.1
Date: 22 Dec 2003 09:43:00 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ogtekuw3ocr.fsf@divan.mitre.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1071786946.16624.37.camel@colossus.columbia.tresys.com>
Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com> writes:
> - Enhanced transitive information flow analysis in Apol. The transitive
> information flow analysis in apol has been significantly enhanced to
> allow the filtering of object classes, object class permissions, and
> intermediate types in queries, finding additional information flows
> between types, and a removal of potential false positives.
How does this version of the information flow analysis address Steve's
observation that it is a bug in the policy if someone is trying to
separate based on the class (vs. using separate types)?
John
Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> writes:
> On Thu, 2003-12-11 at 15:46, Karl MacMillan wrote:
> > Interesting. This seems like a special case to me - "implicit
> > relationship" seems to mean that the information is flowing to that proc
> > file outside of the control of the policy. Just to make certain that I
> > understand, am I correct that information can only flow to proc files in
> > this example? In other words, if there was a plain text file labeled b_t
> > no information could flow through it from c_t to a_t without another
> > rule:
> >
> > allow b_t b_t : file write;
>
> Correct.
>
> > Are there any implicit relationships like this?
>
> Offhand, no, although I may be forgetting something. Sockets
> and System V IPC objects do inherit the type of the creating
> process by default, but there are explicit allow rules authorizing the
> creation and subsequent access. devpts nodes are dynamically created by
> the kernel in response to access to /dev/ptmx, so you never see an
> explicit allow rule for the creation, but they do require explicit allow
> rules for accessing them.
>
> > I agree that this isn't a likely situation (we have yet to see this
> > false positive in a real policy), but one of the goals of automated
> > tools is to detect poorly written policies. However, both of these
> > strategies help prevent a false positive where it can appear that
> > information flows between 2 objects without a subject, which is a likely
> > situation.
>
> I'd view it as a bug in the policy if someone is trying to separate
> based on the class (vs. using separate types).
>
> --
> Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
> National Security Agency
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2003-12-22 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2003-12-18 22:35 Announcement: setools version 1.1 Karl MacMillan
2003-12-22 14:43 ` John D. Ramsdell [this message]
2003-12-22 18:38 ` Karl MacMillan
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