From: xen.org <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
Cc: ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com
Subject: [xen-4.1-testing test] 22399: regressions - FAIL
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 20:46:58 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <osstest-22399-mainreport@xen.org> (raw)
flight 22399 xen-4.1-testing real [real]
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/22399/
Regressions :-(
Tests which did not succeed and are blocking,
including tests which could not be run:
build-amd64-oldkern 3 host-build-prep fail in 22393 REGR. vs. 22257
Tests which are failing intermittently (not blocking):
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 12 guest-localmigrate/x10 fail pass in 22393
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin 9 guest-start fail in 22393 pass in 22399
Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking:
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-freebsd10-amd64 17 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-freebsd10-i386 17 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail in 22393 never pass
version targeted for testing:
xen 684b40eb41c3d5eba55ad94b36fa3702c7720fe1
baseline version:
xen 5891e7c1541199350c0f23452f4487a679037f03
------------------------------------------------------------
People who touched revisions under test:
Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
------------------------------------------------------------
jobs:
build-amd64 pass
build-i386 pass
build-amd64-oldkern pass
build-i386-oldkern pass
build-amd64-pvops pass
build-i386-pvops pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-xl pass
test-i386-i386-xl pass
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-freebsd10-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass
test-amd64-i386-qemuu-freebsd10-i386 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail
test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass
test-amd64-amd64-pair pass
test-amd64-i386-pair pass
test-i386-i386-pair pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass
test-amd64-amd64-pv pass
test-amd64-i386-pv pass
test-i386-i386-pv pass
test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass
test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail
test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail
test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 fail
------------------------------------------------------------
sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com
logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs
images: /home/xc_osstest/images
Logs, config files, etc. are available at
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs
Test harness code can be found at
http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary
Not pushing.
------------------------------------------------------------
commit 684b40eb41c3d5eba55ad94b36fa3702c7720fe1
Author: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Date: Mon Dec 9 14:55:40 2013 +0100
VMX: fix cr0.cd handling
This patch solves XSA-60 security hole:
1. For guest w/o VT-d, and for guest with VT-d but snooped, Xen need
do nothing, since hardware snoop mechanism has ensured cache coherency.
2. For guest with VT-d but non-snooped, cache coherency can not be
guaranteed by h/w snoop, therefore it need emulate UC type to guest:
2.1). if it works w/ Intel EPT, set guest IA32_PAT fields as UC so that
guest memory type are all UC.
2.2). if it works w/ shadow, drop all shadows so that any new ones would
be created on demand w/ UC.
This patch also fix a bug of shadow cr0.cd setting. Current shadow has a
small window between cache flush and TLB invalidation, resulting in possilbe
cache pollution. This patch pause vcpus so that no vcpus context involved
into the window.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 62652c00efa55fb45374bcc92f7d96fc411aebb2
master date: 2013-11-06 10:12:36 +0100
commit 8829f8e3a6aff06f800c32841418afe98f0825bb
Author: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Date: Mon Dec 9 14:51:46 2013 +0100
VMX: remove the problematic set_uc_mode logic
XSA-60 security hole comes from the problematic vmx_set_uc_mode.
This patch remove vmx_set_uc_mode logic, which will be replaced by
PAT approach at later patch.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
master commit: 1c84d046735102e02d2df454ab07f14ac51f235d
master date: 2013-11-06 10:12:00 +0100
commit 649e7ae0df99ffb5bccc17b4cb139c46ce2359a2
Author: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Date: Mon Dec 9 14:50:55 2013 +0100
VMX: disable EPT when !cpu_has_vmx_pat
Recently Oracle developers found a Xen security issue as DOS affecting,
named as XSA-60. Please refer http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-60.html
Basically it involves how to handle guest cr0.cd setting, which under
some environment it consumes much time resulting in DOS-like behavior.
This is a preparing patch for fixing XSA-60. Later patch will fix XSA-60
via PAT under Intel EPT case, which depends on cpu_has_vmx_pat.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
master commit: c13b0d65ddedd74508edef5cd66defffe30468fc
master date: 2013-11-06 10:11:18 +0100
(qemu changes not included)
reply other threads:[~2013-12-11 20:46 UTC|newest]
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