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From: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	William Roberts <bill.c.roberts@gmail.com>,
	"Christopher J. PeBenito" <pebenito@ieee.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user()
Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 17:07:01 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <pjdsgtexwtm.fsf@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <43a3624a-2217-f504-0195-13e4423c7b63@tycho.nsa.gov>


Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:

> On 5/9/19 4:42 AM, Petr Lautrbach wrote:
>> get_ordered_context_list() code used to ask the kernel to 
>> compute the complete
>> set of reachable contexts using /sys/fs/selinux/user aka
>> security_compute_user(). This set can be so huge so that it 
>> doesn't fit into a
>> kernel page and security_compute_user() fails. Even if it 
>> doesn't fail,
>> get_ordered_context_list() throws away the vast majority of the 
>> returned
>> contexts because they don't match anything in
>> /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/default_contexts or
>> /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/
>>
>> get_ordered_context_list() is rewritten to compute set of 
>> contexts based on
>> /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/users/ and
>> /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/default_contexts files and to 
>> return only valid
>> contexts, using security_check_context(), from this set.
>>
>> Fixes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/issues/28
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
>> ---
>>   libselinux/src/get_context_list.c | 185 
>>   ++++++++++--------------------
>>   1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/libselinux/src/get_context_list.c 
>> b/libselinux/src/get_context_list.c
>> index 689e4658..a36c6253 100644
>> --- a/libselinux/src/get_context_list.c
>> +++ b/libselinux/src/get_context_list.c
>> @@ -114,61 +114,24 @@ int get_default_context(const char *user,
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   -static int find_partialcon(char ** list,
>> -			   unsigned int nreach, char *part)
>> -{
>> -	const char *conrole, *contype;
>> -	char *partrole, *parttype, *ptr;
>> -	context_t con;
>> -	unsigned int i;
>> -
>> -	partrole = part;
>> -	ptr = part;
>> -	while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr) && *ptr != ':')
>> -		ptr++;
>> -	if (*ptr != ':')
>> -		return -1;
>> -	*ptr++ = 0;
>> -	parttype = ptr;
>> -	while (*ptr && !isspace(*ptr) && *ptr != ':')
>> -		ptr++;
>> -	*ptr = 0;
>> -
>> -	for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) {
>> -		con = context_new(list[i]);
>> -		if (!con)
>> -			return -1;
>> -		conrole = context_role_get(con);
>> -		contype = context_type_get(con);
>> -		if (!conrole || !contype) {
>> -			context_free(con);
>> -			return -1;
>> -		}
>> -		if (!strcmp(conrole, partrole) && !strcmp(contype, 
>> parttype)) {
>> -			context_free(con);
>> -			return i;
>> -		}
>> -		context_free(con);
>> -	}
>> -
>> -	return -1;
>> -}
>> -
>> -static int get_context_order(FILE * fp,
>> +static int get_context_user(FILE * fp,
>>   			     char * fromcon,
>> -			     char ** reachable,
>> -			     unsigned int nreach,
>> -			     unsigned int *ordering, unsigned int 
>> *nordered)
>> +			     const char * user,
>> +			     char ***reachable,
>> +			     unsigned int *nreachable)
>>   {
>>   	char *start, *end = NULL;
>>   	char *line = NULL;
>>   	size_t line_len = 0;
>> -	ssize_t len;
>> +	ssize_t len, ulen;
>>   	int found = 0;
>> -	const char *fromrole, *fromtype;
>> +	const char *fromrole, *fromtype, *fromlevel;
>>   	char *linerole, *linetype;
>> -	unsigned int i;
>> +	char **new_reachable = NULL;
>> +	char *usercon_str;
>>   	context_t con;
>> +	context_t usercon;
>> +
>>   	int rc;
>>     	errno = -EINVAL;
>> @@ -180,7 +143,8 @@ static int get_context_order(FILE * fp,
>>   		return -1;
>>   	fromrole = context_role_get(con);
>>   	fromtype = context_type_get(con);
>> -	if (!fromrole || !fromtype) {
>> +	fromlevel = context_range_get(con);
>> +	if (!fromrole || !fromtype || !fromlevel) {
>>   		context_free(con);
>>   		return -1;
>>   	}
>> @@ -243,23 +207,52 @@ static int get_context_order(FILE * fp,
>>   		if (*end)
>>   			*end++ = 0;
>>   -		/* Check for a match in the reachable list. */
>> -		rc = find_partialcon(reachable, nreach, start);
>> -		if (rc < 0) {
>> -			/* No match, skip it. */
>> -			start = end;
>> -			continue;
>> +		/* Check whether a new context is valid */
>> +	        ulen = strlen(user) + strlen(start) + 1;
>> +		usercon_str = malloc(ulen);
>> +		if (!usercon_str) {
>> +			rc = -1;
>> +			goto out;
>>   		}
>>   -		/* If a match is found and the entry is not 
>>   already ordered
>> -		   (e.g. due to prior match in prior config file), 
>> then set
>> -		   the ordering for it. */
>> -		i = rc;
>> -		if (ordering[i] == nreach)
>> -			ordering[i] = (*nordered)++;
>> +		/* set range from fromcon in the new usercon */
>> +		snprintf(usercon_str, ulen - 1, "%s:%s", user, 
>> start);
>> +		if (!(usercon = context_new(usercon_str))) {
>> +			fprintf(stderr,
>> +				"%s: can't create a context from 
>> %s\n",
>> +				__FUNCTION__, usercon_str);
>> +			free(usercon_str);
>> +
>> +			continue;
>> +		}
>> +		free(usercon_str);
>> +		context_range_set(usercon, fromlevel);
>
> I think the main potential stumbling block here is the MLS range 
> component. The
> kernel policy defines the default level and allowed range for 
> the (SELinux)
> user, and uses this information in the kernel function 
> mls_setup_user_range(),
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/security/selinux/ss/mls.c#L402,
> to determine the most suitable MLS range for the user session, 
> based on both the
> from-context and the user default and range from the kernel 
> policy.  Just using
> the level from the from-context could fail if the user isn't 
> authorized to
> operate at that level, and even if the user is authorized to 
> operate at that
> level, it could introduce a change in the default behavior if 
> the user's default
> level differs. I think when we have discussed this in the past 
> on the list, we
> were going to either export the user's default level and range 
> information from
> the kernel via selinuxfs and replicate the 
> mls_setup_user_ranges() logic in
> userspace, or have it automatically extracted from the kernel 
> policy during
> policy build into a userspace configuration file that could be 
> used directly by
> userspace.  Or something like that.  This gets a bit tricky 
> though in that the
> logic involves comparing MLS levels, which is intrinsically 
> policy-specific
> logic, and thus if we wanted to truly replicate it in userspace, 
> we'd probably
> need to use libsepol.  Ugh. Maybe the kernel could just provide 
> a simple
> selinuxfs interface for computing the result of 
> mls_setup_user_range() and
> return that piece.
>
> That said, I don't know to what extent anyone is relying on this 
> logic and to
> what extent it is obsoleted by the use of the level/range from 
> seusers.  It
> looks like today we are replacing the level/range in the 
> original from-context
> with the one from seusers before calling this code, in which 
> case the fromlevel
> is in fact the one we ultimately want to use.  So perhaps this 
> doesn't matter
> and we can just go with your approach.

The problem is much complicated than I originally thought and this
patch changes the behavior of get_ordered_context_list what is 
probably
not acceptable.

I'll do more tests and think about it the light of new (for me)
information.

Thanks all for reviews and inputs.

Petr


>> +		usercon_str = context_str(usercon);
>> +
>> +		if (security_check_context(usercon_str) == 0) {
>> +			if (*nreachable == 0) {
>> +				new_reachable = malloc(2 * 
>> sizeof(char *));
>> +				if (!new_reachable) {
>> +					context_free(usercon);
>> +					rc = -1;
>> +					goto out;
>> +				}
>> +			} else {
>> +				new_reachable = 
>> realloc(*reachable, (*nreachable + 2) * sizeof(char *));
>> +				if (!new_reachable) {
>> +					context_free(usercon);
>> +					rc = -1;
>> +					goto out;
>> +				}
>> +			}
>> +			new_reachable[*nreachable] = 
>> strdup(usercon_str);
>> +			new_reachable[*nreachable + 1] = 0;
>> +			*reachable = new_reachable;
>> +			*nreachable += 1;
>> +		}
>> +		context_free(usercon);
>>   		start = end;
>>   	}
>> -
>>   	rc = 0;
>>           out:
>> @@ -313,21 +306,6 @@ static int get_failsafe_context(const char 
>> *user, char ** newcon)
>>   	return 0;
>>   }
>>   -struct context_order {
>> -	char * con;
>> -	unsigned int order;
>> -};
>> -
>> -static int order_compare(const void *A, const void *B)
>> -{
>> -	const struct context_order *c1 = A, *c2 = B;
>> -	if (c1->order < c2->order)
>> -		return -1;
>> -	else if (c1->order > c2->order)
>> -		return 1;
>> -	return strcmp(c1->con, c2->con);
>> -}
>> -
>>   int get_ordered_context_list_with_level(const char *user,
>>   					const char *level,
>>   					char * fromcon,
>> @@ -395,11 +373,8 @@ int get_ordered_context_list(const char 
>> *user,
>>   			     char *** list)
>>   {
>>   	char **reachable = NULL;
>> -	unsigned int *ordering = NULL;
>> -	struct context_order *co = NULL;
>> -	char **ptr;
>>   	int rc = 0;
>> -	unsigned int nreach = 0, nordered = 0, freefrom = 0, i;
>> +	unsigned nreachable = 0, freefrom = 0;
>>   	FILE *fp;
>>   	char *fname = NULL;
>>   	size_t fname_len;
>> @@ -413,23 +388,6 @@ int get_ordered_context_list(const char 
>> *user,
>>   		freefrom = 1;
>>   	}
>>   -	/* Determine the set of reachable contexts for the user. 
>>   */
>> -	rc = security_compute_user(fromcon, user, &reachable);
>> -	if (rc < 0)
>> -		goto failsafe;
>> -	nreach = 0;
>> -	for (ptr = reachable; *ptr; ptr++)
>> -		nreach++;
>> -	if (!nreach)
>> -		goto failsafe;
>> -
>> -	/* Initialize ordering array. */
>> -	ordering = malloc(nreach * sizeof(unsigned int));
>> -	if (!ordering)
>> -		goto failsafe;
>> -	for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++)
>> -		ordering[i] = nreach;
>> -
>>   	/* Determine the ordering to apply from the optional 
>>   per-user config
>>   	   and from the global config. */
>>   	fname_len = strlen(user_contexts_path) + strlen(user) + 2;
>> @@ -440,8 +398,8 @@ int get_ordered_context_list(const char 
>> *user,
>>   	fp = fopen(fname, "re");
>>   	if (fp) {
>>   		__fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER);
>> -		rc = get_context_order(fp, fromcon, reachable, 
>> nreach, ordering,
>> -				       &nordered);
>> +		rc = get_context_user(fp, fromcon, user, 
>> &reachable, &nreachable);
>> +
>>   		fclose(fp);
>>   		if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
>>   			fprintf(stderr,
>> @@ -454,8 +412,7 @@ int get_ordered_context_list(const char 
>> *user,
>>   	fp = fopen(selinux_default_context_path(), "re");
>>   	if (fp) {
>>   		__fsetlocking(fp, FSETLOCKING_BYCALLER);
>> -		rc = get_context_order(fp, fromcon, reachable, 
>> nreach, ordering,
>> -				       &nordered);
>> +		rc = get_context_user(fp, fromcon, user, 
>> &reachable, &nreachable);
>>   		fclose(fp);
>>   		if (rc < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
>>   			fprintf(stderr,
>> @@ -463,40 +420,18 @@ int get_ordered_context_list(const char 
>> *user,
>>   				__FUNCTION__, 
>>   selinux_default_context_path());
>>   			/* Fall through */
>>   		}
>> -		rc = 0;
>> +		rc = nreachable;
>>   	}
>>   -	if (!nordered)
>> +	if (!nreachable)
>>   		goto failsafe;
>>   -	/* Apply the ordering. */
>> -	co = malloc(nreach * sizeof(struct context_order));
>> -	if (!co)
>> -		goto failsafe;
>> -	for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++) {
>> -		co[i].con = reachable[i];
>> -		co[i].order = ordering[i];
>> -	}
>> -	qsort(co, nreach, sizeof(struct context_order), 
>> order_compare);
>> -	for (i = 0; i < nreach; i++)
>> -		reachable[i] = co[i].con;
>> -	free(co);
>> -
>> -	/* Only report the ordered entries to the caller. */
>> -	if (nordered <= nreach) {
>> -		for (i = nordered; i < nreach; i++)
>> -			free(reachable[i]);
>> -		reachable[nordered] = NULL;
>> -		rc = nordered;
>> -	}
>> -
>>         out:
>>   	if (rc > 0)
>>   		*list = reachable;
>>   	else
>>   		freeconary(reachable);
>>   -	free(ordering);
>>   	if (freefrom)
>>   		freecon(fromcon);
>>   
>>


  reply	other threads:[~2019-05-16 15:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-09  8:42 [PATCH] libselinux: Eliminate use of security_compute_user() Petr Lautrbach
2019-05-10  1:44 ` William Roberts
2019-05-10  1:45   ` William Roberts
2019-05-10 14:20   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-05-10 14:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-05-16 15:07   ` Petr Lautrbach [this message]
2020-01-22 13:35     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-23  8:44       ` Petr Lautrbach
2020-01-22 13:56 ` Stephen Smalley

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