From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: fsverity@lists.linux.dev, dsterba@suse.cz
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6.6 1/2] fs,fsverity: reject size changes on fsverity files in setattr_prepare
Date: Tue, 06 Oct 2026 21:47:00 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-162468@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261006213815.47194-2-ebiggers@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] fs: setattr_prepare bypasses fsverity immutability if CONFIG_FS_VERITY=n
--
commit 124beac2c5f385e936a45c9aaf9bc8b5a46a9785
Author: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
fs,fsverity: reject size changes on fsverity files in setattr_prepare
Add the check to reject truncates of fsverity files directly to
setattr_prepare instead of requiring the file system to handle it.
Besides removing boilerplate code, this also fixes the complete lack of
such check in btrfs.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260128152630.627409-2-hch@lst.de
> diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
> index a8ae5f6d9b167..c2302fc4b3330 100644
> --- a/fs/attr.c
> +++ b/fs/attr.c
> @@ -173,7 +173,17 @@ int setattr_prepare(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
> * ATTR_FORCE.
> */
> if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
> - int error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
> + int error;
> +
> + /*
> + * Verity files are immutable, so deny truncates. This isn't
> + * covered by the open-time check because sys_truncate() takes a
> + * path, not an open file.
> + */
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) && IS_VERITY(inode))
> + return -EPERM;
[Severity: High]
Is it possible that this IS_ENABLED() guard bypasses the immutability check
when verity is disabled in the kernel?
Ext4 and F2FS previously relied on fsverity_prepare_setattr() which correctly
returned -EOPNOTSUPP on non-verity kernels. By replacing those checks with
this code, if the kernel is compiled without CONFIG_FS_VERITY, this check
evaluates to false and the truncation is allowed to proceed.
Can an unprivileged user with write permissions to a verity file use
sys_truncate() to destroy its contents and cryptographically sealed metadata
on a kernel compiled without CONFIG_FS_VERITY support?
While I noticed this issue is addressed later in the series by commit
0129f7fd3696d1d9b07abe1ecccfcb575dde56d8 ("fs,fsverity: remove check for
fsverity being enabled in setattr_prepare()"), shouldn't this patch be
self-contained and not introduce new regressions?
> +
> + error = inode_newsize_ok(inode, attr->ia_size);
> if (error)
> return error;
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261006213815.47194-1-ebiggers@kernel.org?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-06 21:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 21:38 [PATCH 6.6 0/2] Forbid truncate of fsverity files on btrfs Eric Biggers
2026-10-06 21:38 ` [PATCH 6.6 1/2] fs,fsverity: reject size changes on fsverity files in setattr_prepare Eric Biggers
2026-10-06 21:47 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-06 21:38 ` [PATCH 6.6 2/2] fs,fsverity: remove check for fsverity being enabled in setattr_prepare() Eric Biggers
2026-10-07 21:03 ` [PATCH 6.6 0/2] Forbid truncate of fsverity files on btrfs Sasha Levin
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