From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Henry Martin" <bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] amdkfd: fix doorbell allocation race creating duplicate allocations
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2026 03:15:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-166239@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261010030230.1764682-1-bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] amdkfd: Double-Checked Locking vulnerability exposes unpinned doorbell BO to mmap
- [High] drm/amdkfd: TOCTOU race in doorbell allocation exposing unpinned BO
--
commit 8544c203ebbbee60344c5d18d017125a93e18d7c
Author: Henry Martin <bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>
amdkfd: fix doorbell allocation race creating duplicate allocations
The commit adds a per-process-device mutex doorbell_mutex inside
kfd_alloc_process_doorbells() to fix a check-and-allocate race condition
where concurrent callers could create duplicate doorbell allocations.
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_doorbell.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_doorbell.c
> index fdcf7f2d1b5b4..55acadc986bee 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_doorbell.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_doorbell.c
> @@ -257,12 +257,21 @@ int kfd_alloc_process_doorbells(struct kfd_dev *kfd, struct kfd_process_device *
> int r;
> struct qcm_process_device *qpd = &pdd->qpd;
>
> + mutex_lock(&pdd->doorbell_mutex);
> +
> + /* Another thread may have won the check-and-allocate race */
> + if (qpd->proc_doorbells) {
> + mutex_unlock(&pdd->doorbell_mutex);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> /* Allocate bitmap for dynamic doorbell allocation */
> qpd->doorbell_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(KFD_MAX_NUM_OF_QUEUES_PER_PROCESS,
[ ... ]
> /* Allocate doorbells for this process */
> r = amdgpu_bo_create_kernel(kfd->adev,
> kfd_doorbell_process_slice(kfd),
> PAGE_SIZE,
> AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_DOORBELL,
> &qpd->proc_doorbells,
> NULL,
> NULL);
> if (r) {
> DRM_ERROR("Failed to allocate process doorbells\n");
> goto err;
> }
> +
> + mutex_unlock(&pdd->doorbell_mutex);
[Severity: Critical]
Does moving the mutex inside this function create a double-checked locking
vulnerability since the outer check is lockless?
When kfd_get_process_doorbells() is called via mmap, it does a lockless check:
if (!pdd->qpd.proc_doorbells) {
if (kfd_alloc_process_doorbells(pdd->dev->kfd, pdd))
/* phys_addr_t 0 is error */
return 0;
}
Concurrently, if another thread is inside kfd_alloc_process_doorbells() and
calls amdgpu_bo_create_kernel() while holding the doorbell_mutex, it assigns
the new BO pointer to &qpd->proc_doorbells before the BO is fully pinned.
Can the thread calling mmap() observe the non-NULL proc_doorbells pointer,
bypass the mutex entirely, and use the unpinned BO? If it calls
amdgpu_bo_gpu_offset() on the unpinned BO, could it calculate a bogus physical
address and map unintended memory to userspace?
> return 0;
>
> err:
> bitmap_free(qpd->doorbell_bitmap);
> qpd->doorbell_bitmap = NULL;
> +unlock:
> + mutex_unlock(&pdd->doorbell_mutex);
> return r;
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261010030230.1764682-1-bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-10 3:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-09 10:18 [PATCH] amdkfd: fix doorbell allocation race creating duplicate allocations Henry Martin
2026-10-09 10:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-09 15:00 ` Kuehling, Felix
2026-10-09 15:33 ` Kuehling, Felix
2026-10-10 2:55 ` henry martin
2026-10-10 3:02 ` [PATCH v2] " Henry Martin
2026-10-10 3:15 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-13 17:39 ` Felix Kuehling
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