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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 20:58:26 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-171919@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-2-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com>

> Mapping uid 0 of the parent into a user namespace requires CAP_SETFCAP,
> because a task in such a namespace can write file capabilities that are
> honoured in the parent.  A task that is already in the namespace has a
> full capability set there and can't be asked any more, so
> verify_root_map() goes by what the creator had, now ns->setfcap_level.
> 
> But setns() lets other tasks in, and they get the full set as well:
> 
>   task A: uid 0, full caps          task B: uid 0, no CAP_SETFCAP
>   unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)
>                                     setns(A's user ns)
>                                       allowed, euid == ns->owner
>                                     write "0 0 1" to /proc/self/uid_map
>                                       ns->setfcap_level is A's -> allowed
> 
> [ ... ]
> unprivileged users joining their own namespaces, are not affected.
> 
> Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> Assisted-by: LLM
> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com?part=2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-14 20:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-14 20:47 [PATCH v2 0/5] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] userns: record how far up CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:54   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:55   ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:54   ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:58   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0 Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:57   ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-14 20:58   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] capabilities: limit fscaps to where CAP_SETFCAP reaches Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:56   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-14 20:47 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP Josef Bacik
2026-10-14 20:55   ` sashiko-bot

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