Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] ipe: add the .ipe policy keyring

[sashiko-bot@kernel.org]

> From: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>
> 
> Add a dedicated .ipe keyring for IPE policy signature verification,
> modeled after the .dm-verity and .bpf keyring implementations.
> 
> With this, userspace can provision its own keys into the keyring,
> then restrict it and activate it for IPE policy signature verification.
> 
> This enables scenarios in which a trusted userspace component generates
> an IPE policy, and creates an ephemeral policy-signing key pair,
> provisions its public certificate, and restricts the IPE keyring during
> the early lifetime of a system. The trusted component can then sign the
> IPE policy, destroy the private key, and load and activate the policy.
> During that phase, the system is considered in a trusted state whereas
> the system transitions into a possibly untrusted state afterwards,
> running arbitrary user-provided applications. In such a scenario, the
> trusted userspace component could reside on a dm-verity protected
> rootfs disk, and applications would reside on additional dm-verity
> protected disks. The latter disks would be dynamically attached and
> their dm-verity root hashes and/or signatures not known a priori to
> launching the system.
> 
> A concrete usage scenario could be Kata Containers, which enables
> running Kubernetes pods in ephemeral, headless utility VMs, possibly
> without systemd. The rootfs disk is static and known beforehand, but
> containerd's image layers might be acquired and transported into the
> VM using the erofs snapshotter and dynamic block device attachment
> using dm-verity.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <manuelh@nvidia.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.

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Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261019-b4-ipe-keyring-rfc-v1-0-156f0b93e843@nvidia.com?part=1