From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1D5A1606A325 for ; Sun, 1 Nov 2026 18:02:36 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key, unprotected) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=g0hRLKqR Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58BF910E3B9; Sun, 1 Nov 2026 18:02:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from sea.source.kernel.org (sea.source.kernel.org [172.234.252.31]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4332010E3B9 for ; Sun, 1 Nov 2026 18:02:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) by sea.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F253040788; Sun, 1 Nov 2026 18:02:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AED091F000C1; Sun, 1 Nov 2026 18:02:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1793556143; bh=I8u/iWJgJctxCUlZMvx8GZD/3SHMvgPnlr62svIrlZY=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=g0hRLKqR4q8/ZkUwhtZptigVI/9KM4fBzxvt5OyBnEGEbA/cpq5SAEH0QNZ28iqUL xjPoyaOEsNUEh/+XeG1DB2NBqtpus+IKlVKtHuhiNU1GsAFc4mRMD+CqhZtE6v1VHi krO/StYCdY6W4WmJb63RIk8IuPm8kkh496G5o5sguyO5PlQJ6QzrMtlxC5xMcKp/Qr 1ux4b+YmtG7ORNjbylSbihiVLrq++KGi0J3PZojZTGqO2AH3q/YnYnw0+foar6hSWw swJmwW+G9GQHCsl2zRFqMZdjCodTfOJJyBD5sEWU6OtG2JNbVHEsHXazJRheGMCz31 gg+0xg+Jv9mNg== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] drm/msm/gem: Fix VM_BIND range check To: "Rob Clark" , dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org In-Reply-To: <20261101174911.25184-2-robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com> References: <20261101174911.25184-1-robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com> <20261101174911.25184-2-robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Sun, 01 Nov 2026 18:02:23 +0000 X-BeenThere: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Sender: "dri-devel" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 X-Archived-By: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(= s) to consider: - [Medium] drm/msm: 64-to-32-bit truncation in size_add() in vm_bind_job_lo= okup_ops() -- commit 0bb1fc19abe2c004d338802c56cd54e0621aa9a6 Author: Rob Clark drm/msm/gem: Fix VM_BIND range check This commit replaces the addition of op->range and op->obj_offset with size_add() in vm_bind_job_lookup_ops() to guard against integer overflow wh= en validating the range against obj->size. > diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_= gem_vma.c > index f687a629629d3..16b3870d5e90e 100644 > --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c > +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c > @@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ vm_bind_job_lookup_ops(struct msm_vm_bind_job *job,= struct drm_msm_vm_bind *args > op->obj =3D obj; > cnt++; > =20 > - if ((op->range + op->obj_offset) > obj->size) { > + if (size_add(op->range, op->obj_offset) > obj->size) { [Severity: Medium] On 32-bit builds, does passing op->range and op->obj_offset to size_add() truncate the upper 32 bits of both 64-bit operands before checking for overflow? In struct msm_vm_bind_op, obj_offset and range are 64-bit values: drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_gem_vma.c: struct msm_vm_bind_op { ... uint64_t obj_offset; uint64_t iova; uint64_t range; ... }; However, size_add() in include/linux/overflow.h takes size_t arguments: static __always_inline size_t __must_check size_add(size_t addend1, size_t = addend2) Earlier in lookup_op(), op->obj_offset is only checked with invalid_alignment(op->obj_offset), which does not reject non-zero upper 32 bits. On 32-bit architectures where size_t is 32 bits wide, an offset such = as 0x100000000ULL is truncated to 0 when passed to size_add(), allowing an out-of-bounds 64-bit op->obj_offset or op->range to bypass the obj->size check in vm_bind_job_lookup_ops() and be stored into vma->gem.offset. Would check_add_overflow() with a uint64_t sum (or range_overflows_t(u64, op->obj_offset, op->range, obj->size)) avoid narrowing the operands on 32-b= it targets? --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261101174911.2518= 4-1-robin.clark@oss.qualcomm.com?part=3D1