From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook
Date: Thu, 05 Nov 2026 17:35:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-199638@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105172210.76706-1-atomlin@atomlin.com>
> At present, the task_setscheduler LSM hook only accepts the target
> task_struct pointer. It lacks visibility into the requested scheduling
> attributes (sched_attr) and the requested CPU affinity mask (cpumask).
> Consequently, security modules are blind to both the target scheduling
> parameters and target CPUs, preventing granular access control decisions
> based on scheduling policy or spatial isolation.
>
> In modern multi-tenant and real-time environments, CPU and scheduling
> isolation are critical boundaries. The inability to audit or restrict
> specific scheduling policy changes or CPU pinning requests limits the
> effectiveness of security policies, particularly when attempting to
> shield isolated or cryptographic cores from unprivileged or compromised
> tasks.
>
> This patch expands the security_task_setscheduler() hook signature to
> [ ... ]
> providing LSMs with the necessary context to enforce strict scheduling
> and affinity policies.
>
> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261105172210.76706-1-atomlin@atomlin.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-05 17:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-05 17:22 [PATCH v5] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-05 17:35 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-06 19:21 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-06 19:50 ` Aaron Tomlin
2026-11-06 19:59 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-12 22:46 ` Chris Down
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