From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] userns: Let LSMs deny the CAP_SETFCAP snapshot for mapping uid 0
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 14:48:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-207213@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net>
> Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> records in parent_could_setfcap whether the creator of a user namespace
> had CAP_SETFCAP, because a creator writing its own uid_map only has
> capabilities in the new namespace. The snapshot uses cap_raised(), so a
> task whose LSM policy denies CAP_SETFCAP can still map uid 0 in a
> namespace it creates.
>
> Use security_capable() against the parent namespace instead: the
> creator's credentials still belong to it at this point, so commoncap
> returns the same result, and only LSM denials are added.
>
> Do not audit this check: creating a user namespace does not use
> CAP_SETFCAP, and most namespaces never map uid 0. The uid_map write
> that later fails has no LSM audit record.
>
> Checking CAP_SETFCAP when the map is written would not work: the
> writer's credentials then belong to the new namespace, where commoncap
> grants the creator all capabilities.
>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110144205.2404088-1-mic@digikod.net?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 14:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-10 14:42 [PATCH] userns: Let LSMs deny the CAP_SETFCAP snapshot for mapping uid 0 Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-10 14:48 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-10 14:51 ` Paul Moore
2026-11-10 15:08 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-10 15:51 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-11-11 14:20 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-11 14:23 ` Christian Brauner
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