All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/landlock: Add KUnit test for mixed valid and unknown namespace bits
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2026 17:29:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-215680@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANkf1tZeotONOj+uYxE0k3BT_mrZpPyaYDA0vj9zFEbY2zYMrw@mail.gmail.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] landlock: test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed() fails on
  !__WARN_FLAGS architectures
- [Low] landlock: weak non-zero check in test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed()
- [Low] landlock: conversational text and duplicated changelog in commit
  message
--

commit b79997e431c689890f9fc8f5cca0b886e3519ebb
Author: Terence White <terrywhite2025@gmail.com>

> security/landlock: Add KUnit test for mixed valid and unknown namespace bits
>
> Good evening,
>
> This patch adds a KUnit test case (test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed) to exercise
> landlock_ns_types_to_bits() with a mixed bitmask containing both a valid
> namespace type (CLONE_NEWNS) and an unknown high bit. This verifies that
> the WARN_ON_ONCE truncation guard behaves as expected under
> partial-taint inputs.
>
> Tested locally with all 40 KUnit tests passing successfully.
>
> With kind regards,
>
> Terry White
>
> Add a KUnit test case (test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed) to exercise
> landlock_ns_types_to_bits() with a mixed bitmask containing both
> a valid namespace type (CLONE_NEWNS) and an unknown high bit.
> This ensures the WARN_ON_ONCE truncation guard functions correctly
> under partial-taint inputs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Terry White <terrywhite2025@gmail.com>

[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but the commit message includes conversational email
notes ("Good evening", "Tested locally...", "With kind regards") that
belong below the "---" separator, duplicates the description paragraph,
and has a name mismatch between Author ("Terence White") and Signed-off-by
("Terry White").

> diff --git a/security/landlock/ns.c b/security/landlock/ns.c
> index 06d9784746fe9..d820289423e32 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ns.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ns.c
> @@ -217,6 +217,20 @@ static void test_ns_types_to_bits_unknown(struct kunit *const test)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static void test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed(struct kunit *const test)
> +{
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BUG))
> +		kunit_skip(test, "requires CONFIG_BUG");
> +
> +	/* clang-format off */
> +	kunit_warning_suppress(test) {
> +		/* clang-format on */
> +		KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test, 0ULL,
> +				landlock_ns_types_to_bits(CLONE_NEWNS | (1ULL << 62)));

[Severity: Low]
Should this assert KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test,
landlock_ns_type_to_bit(CLONE_NEWNS), ...) instead of KUNIT_EXPECT_NE(test,
0ULL, ...)?  Checking only for a non-zero return value would still pass if
the unknown bit leaked into the returned mask or if the wrong bit was set.

> +		KUNIT_EXPECT_SUPPRESSED_WARNING_COUNT(test, 1);
> +	}
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Does KUNIT_EXPECT_SUPPRESSED_WARNING_COUNT(test, 1) fail on architectures
that do not define __WARN_FLAGS, such as ARCH=um (the default for kunit.py)?

On those architectures, WARN_ON_ONCE() in include/asm-generic/bug.h expands
to DO_ONCE_LITE_IF(condition, WARN_ON, 1), which sets its static
__already_done flag before calling into warn_slowpath_fmt() where KUnit
checks kunit_is_suppressed_warning().  Because test_ns_types_to_bits_unknown()
runs earlier in test_cases[] and triggers the single WARN_ON_ONCE() site in
landlock_ns_types_to_bits(), __already_done is already set when
test_ns_types_to_bits_mixed() runs, so the second warning never fires and
the suppressed warning count is 0.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/CANkf1tZeotONOj+uYxE0k3BT_mrZpPyaYDA0vj9zFEbY2zYMrw@mail.gmail.com?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-15 17:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-15 17:14 [PATCH] security/landlock: Add KUnit test for mixed valid and unknown namespace bits Terence White
2026-11-15 17:29 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-215680@kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.