From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/6] selftests/landlock: Test capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 10:44:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-218667@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101845.2523770-7-mic@digikod.net>
> Check that a domain denying CAP_MAC_ADMIN prevents a process from
> changing a file's Smack label and from loading AppArmor policy. Also
> check that denying CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE prevents a process from bypassing
> Smack rules between sockets with distinct labels. The allowed,
> unhandled and unsandboxed variants retain each capability, and an audit
> test checks both Smack denials.
>
> Smack and AppArmor are optional and are not added to the test
> configuration: each test is skipped if its LSM is not active according
> to lsm_list_modules(2), and fails if this syscall fails. The default
> test configuration has no other LSM, so these tests skip there and the
> capable_lsm hook is not exercised.
>
> The cap_other_hooks fixture now covers more than commoncap's checks, so
> update its description, and add CAP_MAC_ADMIN and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to
> the capabilities that the tests may raise.
>
> Without the previous commits, the denied variants and the audit test
> fail with Smack (boot with lsm=landlock,smack), and the denied variants
> fail with AppArmor (lsm=landlock,apparmor).
>
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
> Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117101845.2523770-1-mic@digikod.net?part=6
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:18 [PATCH v2 0/6] Fix Landlock mediation of capabilities guarding LSM policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] lsm: Add a capable_lsm hook for capabilities guarding an LSM's policy Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] landlock: Restrict capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] apparmor: Use security_capable_lsm() for policy capabilities Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:30 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] smack: Use security_capable_lsm() for privilege checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] selinux: Use security_capable_lsm() for CAP_MAC_ADMIN checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:36 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 10:18 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] selftests/landlock: Test capabilities guarding other LSMs' policies Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:44 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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