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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Cai Xinchen" <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	dsterba@suse.cz, "Chuck Lever" <cel@kernel.org>,
	"Jeff Layton" <jlayton@kernel.org>,
	"Anna Schumaker" <anna@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next -v4 14/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:49:03 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219110@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117150542.1169451-15-caixinchen1@huawei.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] landlock: open-fd setattr denied on NTFS streams in
  hook_path_setattr()
- [Medium] fs/stat: duplicate and broken audit_names entries in
  vfs_statx_fd()
- [Medium] selftests/landlock: audit_layout1 tests broken by
  READ_METADATA in ACCESS_FILE
--

commit 14db7d890cf459274a57d8c4bb2e8249b1cd4223
Author: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>

landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights

This commit introduces the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA and
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA access rights and hooks the corresponding
VFS metadata paths to enforce them on paths and opened files.

> diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
> index e68dc17f23c46..a1a5bd83b5079 100644
> --- a/fs/stat.c
> +++ b/fs/stat.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/compat.h>
>  #include <linux/iversion.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>  
>  #include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  #include <asm/unistd.h>
> @@ -361,6 +362,7 @@ static int vfs_statx_fd(int fd, int flags, struct kstat *stat,
>  	CLASS(fd_raw, f)(fd);
>  	if (fd_empty(f))
>  		return -EBADF;
> +	audit_file(fd_file(f));
>  	return vfs_statx_path(&fd_file(f)->f_path, flags, stat, request_mask,
>  			      fd_file(f));
>  }
> @@ -391,6 +393,18 @@ static int vfs_statx(int dfd, struct filename *filename, int flags,
>  		      AT_STATX_SYNC_TYPE))
>  		return -EINVAL;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * An empty pathname with AT_EMPTY_PATH refers to the file descriptor
> +	 * itself.  Resolve it as such so that the struct file is passed down
> +	 * to the LSM hooks, like sys_statx() does for a NULL pathname and
> +	 * unlike a plain path lookup from the file descriptor.  This branch
> +	 * replaces a path lookup, so vfs_statx_fd() keeps auditing the file
> +	 * descriptor as that lookup would have.
> +	 */
> +	if ((flags & AT_EMPTY_PATH) && dfd >= 0 && !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(filename) &&
> +	    !filename->name[0])
> +		return vfs_statx_fd(dfd, flags, stat, request_mask);

[Severity: Medium]
Does dropping filename when redirecting to vfs_statx_fd() produce duplicate
and incomplete AUDIT_PATH records for IORING_OP_STATX with AT_EMPTY_PATH and
an empty string?

io_statx_prep() and io_statx() allocate filename via delayed_getname_uflags()
and complete_getname(), which calls audit_getname() and attaches an
unpopulated audit_names entry (filename->aname) to the audit context.
Previously, filename_lookup() called audit_inode(filename, path.dentry, 0) to
populate filename->aname in place.  With this change, vfs_statx_fd() calls
audit_file() instead, which passes name = NULL to __audit_inode():

kernel/auditsc.c:__audit_inode() {
    ...
	if (!name)
		goto out_alloc;

	/*
	 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
	 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
	 */
	n = name->aname;
    ...
}

Because name is NULL, __audit_inode() allocates a second audit_names entry
with name=(null) and nametype=NORMAL while leaving filename->aname
unpopulated with nametype=UNKNOWN.

> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 2ab67bcad1983..7d0e539b4cda7 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
[ ... ]
> +static int hook_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *const idmap,
> +			     const struct path *const path,
> +			     struct dentry *const dentry,
> +			     struct iattr *const attr,
> +			     struct file *const file)
> +{
> +	unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
> +
[ ... ]
> +	if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
> +		ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID |
> +			      ATTR_KILL_PRIV | ATTR_MODE);
> +
> +	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
> +			  ATTR_TIMES_SET | ATTR_TOUCH | ATTR_KILL_PRIV)))
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	return check_access_path_or_file(path, file,
> +					 LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Can hook_path_setattr() reject fchmod(), fchown(), or futimens() on an
already-opened NTFS named stream file descriptor with -EACCES when the
calling thread's current domain denies LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA?

When notify_change() is called with a non-NULL file, the outer
do_notify_change() call authorizes the operation against
landlock_file(file)->allowed_access, stores only path in attr->ia_path, and
invokes inode->i_op->setattr().  On NTFS named streams,
ntfs_stream_setattr_common() then propagates shared attribute changes to the
base inode without a file pointer:

fs/ntfs/named_stream.c:ntfs_stream_setattr_common() {
    ...
			err = notify_change_target(idmap, attr->ia_path,
						   base_dentry, &base_attr,
						   NULL, NULL);
    ...
}

That second do_notify_change() call invokes hook_path_setattr() with
path = attr->ia_path, dentry = base_dentry, and file = NULL, causing
check_access_path_or_file() to check attr->ia_path against current_cred()
instead of the open file's credentials and emit a false audit denial.

> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index 48c1f896dc9a0..2593db7ef25c1 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -571,11 +571,13 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA | \
> +	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_METADATA | \
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV | \
>  	LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX)

[Severity: Medium]
Does adding LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA to ACCESS_FILE (and therefore
ACCESS_ALL) break the audit_layout1 tests in fs_test.c?

Tests in audit_layout1 such as execute_read, write_file, and read_file call
enforce_fs(_metadata, ACCESS_ALL, NULL) with no allow rules, and then call
matches_log_fs() or matches_log_fs_extra() from the same sandboxed process:

tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c:matches_log_fs_extra() {
    ...
	absolute_path = realpath(path, NULL);
	if (!absolute_path)
		return -errno;
    ...
}

Because LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_METADATA is now denied by ACCESS_ALL, the
stat calls inside realpath() fail with EACCES and generate unexpected
fs.read_metadata audit records, causing those 18 audit_layout1 tests to fail.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117150542.1169451-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com?part=14

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17 15:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 15:05 [PATCH -next -v4 00/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 01/17] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:48   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 18:30   ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 18:34     ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 02/17] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:43   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 18:43   ` Al Viro
2026-11-18  0:16     ` Al Viro
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 03/17] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:59   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 04/17] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:45   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 05/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 06/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:07   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 07/17] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:51   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 08/17] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr and pass struct path and file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 09/17] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:30   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 10/17] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 11/17] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:55   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 12/17] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:02   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 13/17] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 14:59   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 14/17] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:49   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 16/17] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:04   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 15:05 ` [PATCH -next -v4 17/17] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-17 15:05   ` sashiko-bot

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