From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:34:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-219240@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117172341.3152407-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Low] bpf: non-standard multi-line comment style in ___bpf_prog_run()
--
commit ac6a06b7dc1000d82907323434c2003bed5a8873
Author: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
This commit renames spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() on arm64 so that the BPF
interpreter emits a speculation barrier for BPF_NOSPEC, while avoiding
unnecessary barriers in uaccess paths where user pointers are already masked.
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index fc8b133c15f90..adf7ba0cdb06c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -2251,14 +2251,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
> /* ST, STX and LDX*/
> ST_NOSPEC:
> /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
> - * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
> - * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
> - * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
> - * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
> - * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
> - * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
> - * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
> - * x86 for v4 as well.
> + * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
> */
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but BPF code uses the multi-line comment style where the
opening /* goes on its own line with the comment text starting on the next
line.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117172341.3152407-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 17:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 17:23 [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter Ryan Roberts
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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